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Moving Beyond Marriage: A 
Proposed Unit of Presumed 
Economic Interdependence for 
Joint Filing Purposes in 
Bankruptcy and in Tax 
 
Heather V. Graham* 
 
Relational definitions that do not focus on the 
relevant factual attributes of relationships will 
miss their mark, excluding some relationships 
that ought to be included, and including some 
relationships that ought to be excluded. Thus, 
carefully tailoring relational definitions to the 
objectives of particular laws will eliminate 
inequalities and enable laws to accomplish their 
objectives more effectively.1 
 
A man and woman stand at the altar on their wedding day, 
while their family looks on with admiration, and the ring 
bearer stands nearby holding the golden fourteen karat rings 
on a tiny pillow, waiting for his cue. The officiant stands before 
them and prompts the couple to recite their chosen vows, 
asking if they should take each other in sickness and in health, 
for richer or poorer, and if they should love and cherish. With 
an affirmation of “I do” from each, the officiant looks to the ring 
 
  *J.D. Pace University School of Law; B.A. The Richard Stockton College 
of New Jersey; A.A. Ocean County College. I wish to sincerely thank Prof. 
Bridget J. Crawford, Prof. David Cohen, Prof. Erez Aloni, Prof. Noa Ben-
Asher, my mother Lisa Ann Graham, my father Howard Graham, and 
Charlene Cavalcante for providing me with the valuable commentary, advice, 
and support that made this work possible. 
1. LAW COMM'N OF CAN., Beyond Conjugality: Recognizing and 
Supporting Close Personal Adult Relationships 36 (2001), available at 
http://www.samesexmarriage.ca/docs/beyond_conjugality.pdf [hereinafter, 
LAW COMM'N OF CAN.]. 
1
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bearer to hand his rings to the couple. Once the rings are 
exchanged, the officiant announces that the new couple is now 
husband and wife, and permits a kiss for all to see. The newly 
wedded couple parade down the aisle to the delight of family 
and friends, as they begin a new life as husband and wife. 
The relationship of husband and wife entails recognition of 
the marital unit not just from family and friends, but also from 
the government.2 It is through the legally recognized 
relationship of marriage that a married couple may act as a 
single economic unit for bankruptcy and tax purposes.3 For the 
newly married couple that files their income tax for the first 
time, this means having to declare themselves as either 
married and filing jointly or married and filing separate 
returns.4 Their decision as to how to file their income tax will 
be based largely on their relative incomes and whether or not 
they will be benefitted or penalized for doing so.5 Should 
financial tragedy strike, the married couple will likewise be 
able to act as a unit and jointly petition the court in a 
bankruptcy proceeding, if they so choose.6 For the financially 
devastated couple, this means saving on the cost of an 
additional filing fee and an additional legal fee.7 
The traditional scene of marriage described above, 
however, is becoming both more and less familiar, as some 
strive to be permitted to marry while others no longer marry at 
all.8 The end result is that the demographics of the American 
 
2. See infra note 42 (discussing the legal and social status of marriage). 
3. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (permitting a married couple to file a joint 
bankruptcy petition); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2012) (permitting a married couple 
to file a joint income tax return). 
4. 26 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012) (tax rates for individuals who are married and 
filing jointly); § 1(d) (tax rates for individuals who are married yet filing 
separate returns). 
5. See infra notes 140-61 and accompanying text (discussing the 
marriage penalty and the marriage bonus). 
6. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012). 
7. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
8. Compare Marriage in America: The Fraying Knot, ECONOMIST (Jan. 
12, 2013), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21569433-americas-
marriage-rate-falling-and-its-out-wedlock-birth-rate-soaring-fraying 
(describing the decline in marriage rates and efforts directed at encouraging 
marriage), with WHY MARRIAGE MATTERS, Love, Commitment, Family: Why 
Marriage Matters, available at 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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household are rapidly changing while the determination for 
whether one may file jointly for bankruptcy and tax purposes—
marital status—has not.9 Given these changing demographics, 
it would seem that a new determination for when one may file 
jointly, other than marital status, should be used.10 In this 
context, tailoring the objectives of laws to relational definitions 
will help to eliminate inequalities so long as equality also 
remains an objective.11 In keeping with this premise, this 
Comment will look to the history12 and original objectives13 of 
the laws which permit married couples to file jointly for tax 
and bankruptcy purposes, and will articulate a unit which 
matches these objectives with the relational demographic 
realities of American life by exploring alternatives to a 
marriage-based joint filing regime.14 Since both bankruptcy 
and tax law permit married individuals to file as a unit to the 
exclusion of unmarried individuals by permitting joint filing, 
the treatment of married persons in the two fields of law will 
be examined simultaneously, with the goal of articulating a 
unit that can operate within both.15 
In order to promote both equality and efficiency, this 
Comment proposes that individuals should have the 
opportunity to file jointly for tax and bankruptcy purposes 
when they have a relationship predicated upon economic 
interdependence, as opposed to basing the opportunity to file 
 
http://freemarry.3cdn.net/e46734c7784ca7c65f_o7m6bxr76.pdf (educational 
flyer describing why gay and lesbian couples desire the right to marry). 
9. See infra notes 231-60 and accompanying text (citing statistics 
concerning the changing demographics of the American household). See also 
11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012) (permitting married couples to file their bankruptcy 
petitions jointly); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2012) (permitting married couples to 
file a joint income tax return). 
10. See infra Part V.A. 
11. LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 1, at 36. The Law Commission of 
Canada proposes that tailoring the objectives of laws to relational definitions 
will eliminate inequality. Id. This statement holds true, of course, so long as 
equality itself remains an additional objective of the law. 
12. See infra Parts II and III. 
13. See infra notes 268-74 and accompanying text. 
14. See infra Parts V.B and V.C. 
15. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2012). See also infra 
Parts V.B and V.C (articulating a new unit which can be applicable within 
both bankruptcy and tax law). 
3
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jointly upon marital status. Part I of this Comment will briefly 
discuss the history of marriage in the United States. In 
particular, Part I will discuss the role that the government has 
had in promoting and regulating marriage and how the 
treatment of married persons operates to the exclusion of the 
unmarried. Parts II and III of this Comment will provide a 
history of the joint income tax and joint bankruptcy petition. In 
Parts IV(A) and IV(B), this Comment will evaluate and critique 
both the benefits and drawbacks of allowing individuals to file 
jointly for tax and bankruptcy purposes, and discuss the 
implications of joint filing. In Part V(A), this Comment will 
analyze and critique the relevance of the current system, and 
will conclude that both the Bankruptcy Code and the Internal 
Revenue Code must be modernized in order to reflect the 
changing demographics of the American household. In Parts 
V(B) and V(C), this Comment will present the reader with two 
alternative options for modernization: a strictly individual or 
modified individual system or allowance of a unit based on 
presumed economic interdependence. Ultimately, this 
Comment will conclude that a unit based on presumed 
economic interdependence would achieve the most equitable 
result. 
 
I. An Introduction to Marriage in the United States 
 
By proposing that individuals may file jointly when they 
have a relationship predicated upon economic interdependence, 
this Comment is necessarily also proposing that marriage no 
longer be the sole determinative factor in deciding whether or 
not to allow two individuals to file jointly for bankruptcy and 
tax purposes. This is both a big and a small step. It is small in 
that the answer regarding the sensibility of using marital 
status as the sole determinative factor for joint filing purposes 
does not have to reach the ultimate question of what marriage 
means in our society, yet it is large enough to encompass it and 
at least beg the question in this regard. Currently, under 
federal law, the act of marriage will trigger approximately 
1,100 rights and privileges.16 It is important to recognize that 
 
16. See Letter from Dayna K. Shah, Assoc. Gen. Counsel, U.S. Gen. Acct. 
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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the promotion of marriage in this regard operates to the 
exclusion of the unmarried, who may be just as much or more 
deserving of a particular right or privilege.17 In some instances, 
the stigma that results from exclusion can be considered a 
harm in its own right.18 In not only American society, but in 
most other societies as well, marriage remains “the measure of 
all things.”19 Thus, it is important to briefly examine marriage 
in the United States, both to understand the foundation for 
joint filing today and to evaluate the wisdom of basing joint 
filing privileges on marital status in the future. 
Historically speaking, marriage has been “more in the 
service of domestic economies than domesticated love.”20 As 
young people became more economically independent in the 
eighteenth century, however, the idea that love could have a 
place in marriage set the stage for the ‘“love revolution.’”21 
Couples began investing more of their emotions in one another, 
and focusing more on their interpersonal relationship.22 The 
idea that love could have a place within marriage was initially 
met with resistance, as critics of the idea thought that the 
institution of marriage could somehow be undermined by the 
 
Offic, to Bill Frist, Majority Leader, U.S. S., (January 23, 2004), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/assets/100/92441.pdf (providing an updated account to an 
original report that sought to compile legal provisions in which marital status 
played a significant role). 
17. See Cynthia Grant Bowman, The New Family: Challenges to 
American Family Law, 22 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 387, 392 (2010) ("From what we 
know about the characteristics of cohabiting couples - their economic 
interdependence, the presence of children in their households, and other 
sources of vulnerability - there is reason to believe that these couples may in 
fact need the protections of family law even more than married couples do."). 
18. See Katherine M. Franke, Longing for Loving, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2685, 2687 (2008) (describing how she condemns laws that prohibit same-sex 
couples from marrying, not because of a strong feelings regarding the right to 
marry, but from the injustice that results from refusing to “distribute this 
public benefit and status to same-sex  
couples . . . .”). 
19. Id. at 2689. But see Erez Aloni, Registering Relationships, 87 TUL. L. 
REV. 573, 577 (2013) (describing how France and Belgium have taken 
significant steps toward recognition of cohabitating couples). 
20. ELIZABETH BRAKE, MINIMIZING MARRIAGE: MARRIAGE, MORALITY, AND 
THE LAW 10 (2012). 
21. Id. 
22. Stephanie Coontz, The World Historical Transformation of Marriage, 
66 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 974, 978 (2004). 
5
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instability of love.23 This idea emerged concurrently with the 
idea that women were naturally domestic, and that men and 
women had sexual differences between them that mandated 
sharply defined marital roles.24 Thus, although some thought 
that love might have a place in marriage, marriage retained its 
institutional role by regulating both the domestic economy and 
the relative roles of men and women.25 According to Norma 
Basch, even during nineteenth century America, marriage was 
“a contract unlike any other.”26 
During this time, it was divorce that made revocable an 
otherwise irrevocable contract.27 Divorce, at least throughout 
early American history, was extremely difficult to obtain.28 In 
some states, divorce was impossible to obtain, and in others, it 
was permitted only in a narrow range of instances that often 
treated men and women quite differently.29 Only a couple of 
states permitted divorce due to unhappiness in the mid-1800s, 
and these laws were eventually overturned.30 Essentially, the 
avenues to divorce were severely restricted until the advent of 
the no-fault divorce in the 1970s.31 That is not to say that 
Americans were forever bound by their marriages or that 
marriage in itself was not a subject of contention—many 
Americans who would have otherwise divorced would choose to 
separate, while others who wished to avoid the stigma of 
separation would travel to another state to either obtain a 
divorce under more forgiving laws or reinvent themselves as if 
they were never married at all.32 
 
23. BRAKE, supra note 20, at 10. See also Coontz, supra note 22, at 978 
(stating that contemporaries at the time feared that love would lead to 
problems both in personal and gender relations). 
24. BRAKE, supra note 20, at 10. 
25. Id. (discussing how the idea that men and women were inherently 
different and suited to differing marital roles ultimately shaped the dynamic 
of the workforce). 
26. NORMA BASCH, FRAMING AMERICAN DIVORCE 3 (1999). 
27. Id. at 3. 
28. BRAKE, supra note 20, at 11. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. In 1849, Connecticut and Maine liberalized their divorce laws to 
permit no-fault divorce, but these laws were eventually overturned by the 
1880s. Id. 
31. Id. 
32. HENDRIK HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 20, 31 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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Throughout much of American history, the marital roles of 
men and women were either directly or indirectly shaped by 
the doctrine of coverture. According to this doctrine, the person 
of the wife was legally covered by that of her husband, and her 
identity subsumed and incorporated, if existent at all.33 In the 
earliest part of American history, this meant the inability of a 
woman to form a contract, own property, and file a lawsuit, in 
addition to being subjected to her husband’s “domestic 
chastisement.”34 The doctrine of coverture, however, 
experienced gradual erosion during the nineteenth century.35 
As it eroded, it left vestiges in its wake and indirectly affected 
the lives of Americans in the twentieth century by doing so.36 
Although the history of marriage in the United States may 
make it seem a stark contrast to modern marriages today, 
 
(2000). 
33. BRAKE supra note 20, at 10-11; 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *430 (1765-1769) ("By marriage, the 
husband and wife are one person in the law: that is, the very being or legal 
existence of the woman is suspended during the marriage, or at least is 
incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband"). 
34. HARTOG, supra note 32, at 115-16 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). Due to their identities being covered, husbands were largely 
considered responsible for the acts of their wife, which prevented women from 
being held liable for certain felonies if they were committed in his company. 
Id. at 116. According to this logic, a husband was permitted to engage in 
“domestic chastisement” in the form of violence, since he would be held liable 
for her misdeeds. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
35. Id. at 290-91. One casebook, written in 1899, stated that the old 
common law doctrines regarding husband and wife no longer existed “in full 
force in any jurisdiction.” Id. at 290. The author recommended studying the 
doctrines, however, because few, or perhaps none, of the states had 
completely rid themselves of the common law doctrines altogether. Id. One 
can see this very gradual erosion as women began to enter the field of law. 
Compare Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1872) (Bradley, J., 
concurring) (citing the doctrine of coverture as a reason to affirm Bradwell’s 
rejection of a license to practice law, due to her status as a married woman), 
with Admission of Women to Practise at the Bar, 8 HARV. L. REV. 174, 174 
(1894) (describing how the doctrine of coverture was once cited as a reason for 
women to not practice law, since they could use coverture to avoid 
responsibility to client or contract, but that women are almost universally 
liable for their contracts, and as a result there is no reason why they should 
not practice law). 
36. HARTOG, supra note 32, at 308. Marital rape laws are an ideal 
example of how vestiges of the doctrine of coverture persisted well into the 
twentieth century. In the 1970s, feminists pushed for rape to be a crime not 
only outside of marriage, but within it as well. Id. 
7
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there are some very important similarities. First, marriage is 
still an institution that is regulated by the States.37 Second, the 
States still decide who is married and who is not, and along 
with the federal government, allocate privileges accordingly.38 
In the past, the States strived to regulate the race of those who 
married, and to ensure that marriage remained a monogamous 
institution.39 Today, the States still regulate marriage, with the 
current debate often centering around the sex and gender of 
those who marry.40 
The precise meaning of marriage, however, is debatable 
and often subjective. Debate exists as to whether or not 
marriage is a natural or social construct, a religious mandate, a 
 
37. Anne B. Brown, The Evolving Definition of Marriage, 31 SUFFOLK U. 
L. REV. 917, 922 (1998). Generally speaking, courts give the states great 
deference in regulating marriage as a whole, which includes when marriage 
can be created and terminated. Id. Any regulation created by a state, 
however, is subject to constitutional limitation. Id. at 922-23. 
38. Id. at 922. A recent decision by the Supreme Court is illustrative of 
the tenuous relationship between the states and the federal government 
regarding the regulation of marriage. In United States v. Windsor, the 
Supreme Court held that § 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) was 
unconstitutional. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013). Section 3 amended the 
Dictionary Act to define marriage as between one man and one woman for 
federal purposes. Id. at 2683. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, 
acknowledged that the federal government does, in certain instances, 
regulate marriage and its incidental privileges. For instance, Justice 
Kennedy provides that federal immigration law prohibits aliens who 
procured marriages for the purpose of gaining admission into the United 
States from obtaining immigrant status. Id. at 2690. Additionally, common 
law marriages are recognized in certain instances for Social Security 
purposes. Id. at 2690. Justice Kennedy reiterated, however, that although the 
federal government regulates marriage in certain instances, “[b]y history and 
tradition the definition and regulation of marriage . . . has been treated as 
being within the authority and realm of the separate States.” Id. at 2689-90. 
39. BRAKE, supra note 20, at 11. Marriage, at one time, was a privilege 
only accorded to full-blooded white citizens. Following the emancipation of 
African Americans, the states still strived to prevent those of different races 
from marrying. Id. States were likewise concerned with the perceived 
Mormon threat and enforced monogamy by disenfranchising polygamous 
Mormon men. Id. at 11-12. At one time, fornication outside marriage was a 
criminal act in all fifty states and culminated in severe legal discrimination 
against unwed mothers and illegitimate children until the 1970s, at least in 
its most severe forms. Id. at 12. Thus, choice of marriage and sexual relations 
in the past could result in evisceration of legal rights, disenfranchisement, or 
loss of freedom. 
40. See infra note 255 (providing the current state of the law with regard 
to gay marriage and civil unions). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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means of oppression, or whether it simply a means of 
expressing love.41 Thus, marriage can mean something to one 
person that it does not to another. Yet separate and apart from 
all the meanings that may or may not be attached to it, there 
exists the undeniable legal and social status that it confers.42 
As much as marriage may have changed over time, the marital 
status still confers economic benefits and penalties that 
ultimately shape the role of marriage in American society.43 
The economic consequences of marriage are likewise 
apparent when the married couple is permitted to act as a 
single economic unit. In our society, this happens in at least 
two instances: when the married couple submits their tax 
return and when they file for bankruptcy.44 The married couple 
is permitted to do so, however, to the exclusion of the 
unmarried. Contrary to its singular terminology, the phrase 
“unmarried” encompasses a wide variety of groups and 
individuals who may or may not be as financially intertwined 
as those who are married.45 In this light, it is imperative to 
examine whether or not acting as a single economic unit is 
desirable in light of the benefits that it confers and if marriage 
is still relevant in light of the current state of the joint filing 
regime. In the end, the answers to such questions will reveal a 
message about the implications of marriage and its relevance 
 
41. BRAKE, supra note 20, at 8-9. 
42. Nancy Cott, The Public Stake, in JUST MARRIAGE 33-34 (Mary 
Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004). Marriage confers a status, just as being a minor 
versus an adult confers a status, and designates certain rights and privileges 
in that respect. Id. It is also a contract, not solely between the married 
couple, but with the state as well. Id. at 34. See also Milton C. Regan Jr., 
Between Justice and Commitment, in JUST MARRIAGE 72 (Mary Lyndon 
Shanley ed., 2004) ("Marriage serves [a] process of social validation with 
respect to the value of commitment. It bestows on partners a formal legal 
status that is the basis for impersonal rights and obligations."). 
43. Compare BRAKE, supra note 20, at 12 (marriage grants over 1,100 
rights and privileges), with infra notes 140-61 and accompanying text 
(discussing the marriage penalty that can result in taxation). 
44. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a)(2012); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a)(2012). 
45. See generally Bowman, supra note 17 (describing a variety of 
potentially non-marital households, such as extended family households, 
single-parent households, cohabitation, and gay partnerships). Bowman also 
notes that "[t]he majority of cohabitants pool their incomes in some way, and 
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that reach far past the realm of our bankruptcy and tax laws. 
 
II. A History of Joint Income Taxation 
 
The joint income tax has a long and arduous history that 
can perhaps best be described as a constant battle. Income 
taxation, in and of itself, was once a source of great 
controversy. In 1895, the income tax was held 
unconstitutional.46 Thus, in 1913, the Sixteenth Amendment 
was enacted, which permitted taxation on income “from 
whatever source derived, without apportionment among the 
several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”47 When the Sixteenth Amendment was enacted 
in 1913, however, little thought was given as to the appropriate 
unit for taxation.48 Since the Sixteenth Amendment was 
ratified, contentious debate has ensued over whether or not the 
proper unit of taxation should be the individual or the family.49 
In 1913, Congress created a system in which the individual 
would be the taxable unit.50 Under this framework, the “net 
income of every individual” was subject to taxation.51 The 
Treasury Department had less than one month to promulgate 
regulations and declared that married couples were to be 
treated as units.52 According to the Treasury Department, the 
husband was to report the aggregate income of both husband 
and wife.53 As a result of this declaration, some married 
couples that were dual-wage earners experienced a marriage 
penalty.54 In 1914, regulations changed once again, as married 
 
46. See generally Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 157 U.S. 429 
(1895). 
47. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
48. Stephanie Hunter McMahon, To Have and to Hold: What Does Love 
(of Money) Have to Do With a Joint Tax Filing? 11 NEV. L.J. 718, 723 (2011). 
49. Boris I. Bittker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. 
L. REV. 1389, 1399 (1975) (discussing the evolution of the income tax in the 
years 1913 to 1948). 
50. McMahon, supra note 48, at 723. 
51. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
52. Id. 
53. Id. at 724. 
54. Id. at 723-24. In order to understand how the marriage penalty 
worked at this time, note that the individual exemption was $3000 and the 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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women were allowed to file their income tax returns separately 
from their husbands.55 Very few women, however, elected to do 
so. Less than 7000 separate returns were filed from married 
women that year, which represented little more than two 
percent of the total tax returns received from married persons, 
and this included tax returns from married women who were 
not able to file legally with their husbands since they were not 
living in the same household.56 Shortly after this 
pronouncement, the Treasury Department declared that 
husbands and wives were to file separately, at least for 
purposes of the surtax.57 The right of married couples to file 
jointly was first recognized in 1918, but for many the only 
advantage for doing so was convenience.58 The tax system 
remained biased in favor of the individual, and applied the 
same rate schedule regardless of whether the return was 
individual or joint.59 
This initial debate concerning the proper taxable unit was 
as much about the relative roles of men and women as it was 
 
allowable exemption for those who were married was $4000. A husband and 
wife who each earned $2500 would suffer from the marriage penalty, as their 
combined income would be $5000. Had they not married, however, neither of 
them would be subject to taxation. Id. 
55. McMahon, supra note 48, at 724. 
56. Id. at 724 & n.27. 
57. Id. at 724. It is important to keep in mind that, for purposes of this 
discussion, the wealthy paid a disproportionate share of the income taxes, 
and most Americans paid no income taxes at all. Id. at 725. The income tax 
exemptions, which were $3000 for individuals and $4000 for married couples, 
allowed most middle income Americans to escape income taxation. Joseph J. 
Thorndike, Reforming the Internal Revenue Service: A Comparative History, 
53 ADMIN. L. REV. 717, 740 (2001). A surtax, or an additional tax upon an 
income tax, was also imposed, which could range from one percent to six 
percent of income. Id. The first bracket of surtax was imposed upon $20,000 
of annual income, and the highest bracket in which the surtax would be 
imposed occurred when annual income was $500,000 or more. Id. 
58. Bittker, supra note 49, at 1400. 
59. Id. One instance in which the filing of a joint return was not 
economically disadvantageous occurred when a married couple had a very 
large amount of charitable contributions. The amount that a taxpayer may 
deduct for a charitable contribution is based on adjusted gross income. By 
pooling their aggregate income in filing a joint return, a married couple 
would be able to raise their adjusted gross income, and thus take a higher 
charitable contribution deduction. This circumstance, however, did not likely 
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about economic utility, if not more.60 It was not entirely clear 
whether or not women should be treated as persons under the 
Sixteenth Amendment,61 and one congressman remained 
concerned over the effect the Married Women’s Property Acts 
would have on the constitutionality of the joint income tax 
return.62 According to Alice Klessler-Harris, this controversy 
was not simply over taxes, and incorporated considerations of 
state versus federal rights, justice and fairness, and the rights 
of property owners and citizens.63 At center stage in this 
debate, however, was the personhood of women.64 
When the Treasury initially declared, in 1913, that 
married persons were to be the economic unit, it did so by 
depicting the male breadwinner image of the family.65 
According to the Treasury Department, the husband was to 
report aggregate income, because he was “the head and legal 
representative of the household and general custodian of its 
income.”66 A significant number of women at this time, 
however, had fought arduously for their property rights and 
wanted to control their property both actually and 
symbolically.67 Many men who were married to women who 
owned property also did not want to report it as their own.68 
Caught in the middle of this debate, the Treasury continued to 
promote the image of male breadwinner families, but framed 
its position on “ability to pay.”69 At this time, the Treasury was 
attempting to defend both itself and the income tax as a whole, 
which was unpopular.70 As a defense mechanism, the Treasury 
 
60. Alice Kessler-Harris, “A Principle of Law But Not of Justice”: Men, 
Women, and Income Taxes in the United States 1913-1948, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & 
WOMEN'S STUD. 331, 333-34 (1997). 
61. Id. 
62. McMahon, supra note 48, at 723. Congressman Cordell Hull was 
concerned, early on, that the joint income tax would conflict with the separate 
interests in property rights that the Married Women’s Property Acts created. 
Id. 
63. Kessler-Harris, supra note 60, at 333-34. 
64. Id. 
65. McMahon, supra note 48, at 723. 
66. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). 
67. Kessler-Harris, supra note 60, at 334-35. 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. Id. at 335. 
12http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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evoked images of equity and male breadwinner families in an 
attempt to legitimize the income tax.71 Eventually, however, 
the Treasury began to argue for family taxation, which was the 
result of its original commitment to taxing individuals based on 
their ability to pay.72 Inherent in the logic that taxation should 
be based on ability to pay was the notion that women who 
earned income were taxpaying persons who should have to pay 
their fair share of taxes, even if it meant thrusting their family 
income into a higher tax bracket.73 Thus, although the rhetoric 
of the Treasury evoked an image of women as non-persons, the 
reality was that women were claiming their own income and 
getting treated as persons in that respect.74 
In the early years of income taxation, however, very few 
paid taxes and those who did were among the wealthiest.75 Not 
surprisingly, there was a strong incentive for husbands to 
devise ways to assign income to their wives in order to reduce 
their tax burden in the progressive system.76 The Treasury was 
concerned that such efforts might ultimately undermine the 
progressive tax system altogether.77 A variety of methods were 
utilized for assignment purposes, and women who lacked 




73. Klesser-Harris, supra note 60, at 334-35. 
74. Id. at 336. 
75. Id. at 335. Taxation was heavily weighted in favor of taxing the 
wealthiest. All but a minority were exempted from taxation altogether. There 
was even an additional surcharge added in 1920 that placed an additional tax 
for those on the higher end of the income brackets. Id. See also McMahon, 
supra note 48, at 725. Although the number of individuals who paid income 
taxes grew from two percent to fifteen percent from 1913 to 1918, 
respectively, in 1918 the wealthiest one percent of Americans accounted for 
approximately eighty percent of all revenue raised. Id. 
76. Kessler-Harris, supra note 60, at 335-36. Assume, fictitiously, that 
the tax rate for incomes $100,000 and above is fifty percent and any amount 
under $20,000 is subject to a ten percent rate, and the husband earned 
$100,000 while the wife had no earned income. Ignoring for a moment any 
other particular deductions or exemptions they may have available to them, 
the husband would be taxed $50,000 if he declared his entire income on his 
own tax return. If he can assign some of that income to his wife, however, it 
may reduce his overall tax liability. If he were able to assign $10,000 to her, 
this would reduce his tax liability from $50,000 to $40,000, and she would 
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their husbands or with a large number of trusts.78 The history 
in this area is fraught with colorful attempts by wealthy men to 
lower their tax liability.79 In one instance, a man was reported 
to have set up 197 trusts in his wife’s name.80 
Eventually, married people were treated very differently 
based on the type of income they reported on their tax return 
and the state in which they resided. In Lucas v. Earl, Mr. and 
Mrs. Earl attempted to assign one half of Mr. Earl’s earned 
income to Mrs. Earl via private contract.81 The Supreme Court 
held, however, that this type of anticipatory arrangement could 
undermine the system of taxation, and no contract “however 
skilfully [sic] devised” could be used to lower the tax burdens of 
individuals.82 The end result was that couples who earned 
income-producing property could lessen their tax burden by 
shifting property from one spouse to another, while those who 
had earned income were unable to do so, even with a contract 
that was valid under state law.83 
A similar dichotomy formed between the treatment of 
married persons in common law versus community property 
states.84 In Poe v. Seaborn, the Supreme Court held that it was 
 
78. Id. The trust was a particularly crafty way of assigning income, since 
it helped husbands to avoid the loss of control that would come with fully 
assigning the income to their wives. McMahon, supra note 48, at 726. In 
contrast, the partnership was only really useful for married persons with 
businesses. Id. 
79. McMahon, supra note 48, at 725-32 (describing techniques used to 
lower tax liability). 
80. Id. at 731. At one point, this issue received such great attention that 
some of the public started to blame these individuals for the Great 
Depression. Id. 
81. Lucas v. Earl, 281 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1930). 
82. Id. at 115. 
83. Pamela B. Gann, Abandoning Marital Status as a Factor in 
Allocating Income Tax Burdens, 59 TEX. L. REV. 1, 11-12 (1980). Under Lucas, 
it became “virtually impossible” for the typical wage-earning husband to 
assign any income. Such assignment was permitted for the unearned income 
of income-generating property, however, because the “fruit” which came from 
the “tree” was to be taxed to whomever received the “fruit.” Thus, the “tree” 
could be assigned and the “fruit” taxed to the donee. Bittker, supra note 49, 
at 1401. 
84. Marisa Nelson, The IRS Moves To Income Tax Equality For Same-
Sex Couples Despite DOMA, 45 U.S.F. L. REV. 1145, 1164 (2011). 
 
Community property, as opposed to separate property, 
14http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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permissible for married couples residing in community 
property states to split their income for taxation purposes.85 
Lucas and Poe, taken together, caused married persons to be 
treated quite arbitrarily for taxation purposes. Spouses were 
treated differently not only based on what state they resided in, 
but on whether or not they reported earned or unearned 
income.86 Under Lucas, earned income could not be assigned 
while unearned income could be split to avoid tax liability, and 
under Poe, those in community property states could split their 
income while those in common law states could not.87 The issue 
of income assignment became even more salient in the 1940s, 
when the maximum marginal tax rates rose to over ninety 
percent and the temptation to assign income was greater than 
ever.88 
Congress eventually passed the Revenue Act of 1948 in 
order to resolve this dilemma.89 The Act essentially extended 
Poe to all fifty states, allowing married couples to split their 
income, without requiring states to adopt the community 
property system.90 This helped to immediately provide a sense 
of national uniformity, creating the same effect as if the states 
had all adopted community property regimes.91 Thus, under 
the Revenue Act of 1948, married couples were permissibly 
able to split their income as if they were in a community 
property state or achieved the result that was attempted in 
 
means that property acquired during a marriage is 
considered under state law to be owned jointly by both 
spouses. From the moment one spouse earns a paycheck, 
that paycheck is community property, and is considered as 
belonging one-half to the spouse who earned it and one-half 
to the other spouse. 
 
Id. 
85. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101, 117-18 (1930). 
86. Gann, supra note 83, at 15. 
87. Id. at 11, 15. Note that when income was split for community 
property purposes under Poe, it was done so regardless of whether the income 
was earned or unearned. Bittker, supra note 49, at 1404-05. 
88. Carolyn C. Jones, Split Income and Separate Spheres: Tax Law and 
Gender Roles in the 1940s, 6 LAW & HIST. REV. 259, 259 (1988). 
89. Gann, supra note 83, at 18. 
90. Id. 
91. Bittker, supra note 49, at 1412-13. 
15
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Lucas v. Earl.92 The basic premise of income splitting is this: a 
married couple aggregates all of their income and deductions 
on a single joint return, and their tax liability is “what a single 
person would pay on one-half their consolidated taxable 
income.”93 According to Carolyn Jones, however, “[t]he choice of 
the income-splitting joint return was neither obvious nor 
inevitable.”94 For one, it was a very expensive decision, since it 
offered a vast opportunity for married couples to reduce their 
overall tax liability.95 It had the advantage, however, of 
administrative ease and the supposed advantage of preserving 
“traditional gender roles and power relationships.”96 This Act 
provided the framework for the taxation of married persons 
today. 
 
III. A History of the Joint Bankruptcy Petition 
 
Unlike the joint income tax, the inception of the joint 
bankruptcy petition was a much less contested matter.97 
Generally speaking, however, bankruptcy law has had a much 
more contentious history. The bankruptcy clause, which 
permitted Congress to enact bankruptcy legislation, was added 
to the Constitution with little debate.98 Congress was unable to 
adopt lasting and stable bankruptcy legislation, however, until 
the year 1898.99 Prior to the 1898 Act, debate ensued over 
 
92. See id. at 1412 (suggesting that had Congress not enacted the 
Revenue Act of 1948, the result may have well been a universal adoption of 
community property among the states). 
93. Id. at 1412-13. 
94. Jones, supra note 88, at 296. 
95. Id. 
96. Id. 
97. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978); A. Mechele Dickerson, Family 
Values and the Bankruptcy Code: A Proposal to Eliminate Bankruptcy 
Benefits Awarded on the Basis of Marital Status, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 69, 91 
(1998) [hereinafter Dickerson, Family Values] (noting the "scant legislative 
history" regarding the passage of § 302). 
98. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress to “establish 
an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of 
Bankruptcies throughout the United States”). 
99. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY 
LAW IN AMERICA 23 (2001). According to David A. Skeel, Jr., American 
bankruptcy history can essentially be divided into three main eras. Id. at 5. 
16http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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whether or not to have voluntary bankruptcy, both voluntary 
and involuntary bankruptcy, or none at all.100 
Section 302, which codified the joint bankruptcy petition, 
was not added to the Bankruptcy Code until 1978, when the 
Code underwent a period of significant revitalization.101 The 
late arrival of the joint petition in bankruptcy is due in large 
part to the effect of the doctrine of coverture on married 
women.102 Upon the act of marriage, a husband assumed any 
debts that his wife may have had, and any that she would incur 
in the future.103 Thus, even if a woman operated a business and 
incurred each dollar of debt on her own, her husband would 
presumably be the sole debtor, since he owned the business and 
its assets and was legally responsible for the debts of his 
wife.104 Prior to the nineteenth century, this meant not only 
 
The first era ended when Congress adopted stable bankruptcy legislation in 
1898. Id. at 5. The second era began during the Great Depression and during 
the advent of the New Deal, when many were calling for reform to the 1898 
act. Id. at 4-5. Although reforms to the 1898 legislation were not as far-
reaching as some would have preferred, the more modest reforms that did 
take hold solidified and expanded bankruptcy practice in America. Id. at 5. 
Many at this time wanted American bankruptcy law to become more 
administrative, much like the English system. Had this taken hold, it may 
have involved the creation of a government agency. Id. at 4. Eventually, 
however, there would be yet another call to reform. 
100. SKEEL, supra note 99, at 46. The bankruptcy debate was also 
shaped by geographical region, with Northeastern Republicans in favor of 
bankruptcy, while Southern and Western Democrats were more hostile to the 
idea. Id. Essentially, the debate placed those with agrarian interests and 
those who favored states' rights against those who favored a more national 
economy and viewed bankruptcy as a solution to economic distress. Id. at 23. 
It was not until the rise of commercial organizations and the bankruptcy bar, 
along with a period of Republican political control, that stable bankruptcy 
legislation was passed. Id. at 46. 
101. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012); SKEEL, supra note 99, at 5. 
102. See supra notes 33-36 and accompanying text (discussing the role of 
the doctrine of coverture in America). Although the doctrine of coverture 
experienced gradual erosion throughout American history, its vestiges lasted 
into the 1970s. Id. 
103. Karen Pearlston, Married Women Bankrupts in the Age of 
Coverture, 34 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 265, 271-72 (2009). 
104. Id. The question of how to reconcile the doctrine of coverture with 
married women and property stretches back to medieval times. Id. at 270. 
During the medieval era, an exception to the doctrine of coverture was 
created for the feme sole trader, a married woman who operated a business 
and was treated in certain respects as a single woman. Id. In order to be 
bankrupt at the time, one had to be a trader and debtor. Id. at 271-72. Thus, 
17
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that wives’ property would be held by their husbands in fee 
simple upon marriage, but that property originally theirs prior 
to the marriage could be seized by creditors in order to satisfy 
the debts of their husbands.105 Tenancy by the entirety laws, 
however, functioned to protect household assets.106 Such laws 
were designed to help shield the household assets from seizure, 
and to decrease the likelihood that a husband would drive his 
family into poverty by incurring significant amounts of debt.107 
The nature of entirety property helped to protect women’s 
interests as well, since the husband could not “alienate or 
encumber it unilaterally.”108 
Eventually, the Married Women’s Property Acts would 
give American women more control over their personal 
property.109 Although conventional storytelling dictates that 
such acts ended barriers that blocked women’s ownership of 
property and began to recognize the right to equality, the 
reality is that the earliest acts had more to do with bankruptcy 
than the liberation of women.110 At times, Married Women’s 
 
a legal question arose as to how to treat the feme sole trader, who was a 
married woman covered by the doctrine of coverture, yet for all relevant 
purposes was also trader and debtor. Id. Although this problem illustrates a 
legal predicament that took place prior to the founding of America, it serves 
as an ideal illustration of the legal problems caused by the confluence of the 
doctrine of coverture, married women, and debts that only they incurred. 
105. Joan C. Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y 
& L. 383, 385 (1994). See also Marie T. Reilly, In Good Times and in Debt: 
The Evolution of Marital Agency and the Meaning of Marriage, 87 NEB. L. 
REV. 373, 376 (2008) (“Without legal capacity or property of their own, 
married women were hardly worth creditors’ attention”). 
106. Benjamin C. Ackerly, Tenants by the Entirety Property and the 
Bankruptcy Reform Act, 21 WM. & MARY L. REV. 701, 702 (1980). Tenancy by 
the entirety is a form of “concurrent ownership” in which the four unities of a 
joint tenancy (“time, title, interest, and possession”) plus marriage must 
occur. Id. Characteristics of tenancy by the entirety property include the 
inability of such property to be subject to judicial partition, the inability of 
one spouse to dispose of entirety property without the consent of the other 
spouse, the inability of one spouse to subject entirety property to liability for 
payment of debt, and the right of survivorship. Id. at 702-03. 
107. A. Mechele Dickerson, To Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay: Should 
Spouses Be Forced to Pay Each Other’s Debts? 78 B.U. L. REV. 961, 972 (1998) 
[hereinafter Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay]. 
108. Reilly, supra note 105, at 379. 
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Property Acts were passed concurrently with other debt relief 
statutes, and had more to do with shielding property from 
creditors than they did with equality.111 In the first half of the 
nineteenth century, the passage of these acts also coincided 
with economic distress.112 In the post-civil war period, women 
were given some control over wages in these acts, although it 
meant little to most women who did not work outside the 
home.113 There were also notable caveats in some of these laws, 
such as giving the married woman the right to retain title to 
her property, but not to exercise control or dominion over it.114 
Under the 1898 bankruptcy act, if only one spouse entered 
bankruptcy, entirety property could be shielded from the 
proceeding provided that state recognized entirety property as 
exempt when one spouse filed.115 Interestingly enough, if both 
spouses were to file for bankruptcy, the proceedings would be 
consolidated and three estates were created—the husband’s, 
the wife’s, and the joint estate consisting of aggregate entirety 
property.116 This result was influenced by the fact that entirety 
property is premised on the legal fiction that the husband and 
wife merge upon being wed.117 Most women, however, were not 
able to so file well into the beginning of the twentieth century, 
because common law and/or state law prevented them from 
 
111. Id. 
112. Reilly, supra note 105, at 381. 
113. Id. at 383. Note, however, that women were not given the right to 
control their own wages in the state of Georgia until 1943. Williams, supra 
note 105, at 389. 
114. Reilly, supra note 105, at 383-84. The issue of control in entirety 
estates posed interesting legal questions in community property jurisdictions. 
Id. at 389. It seemed, at first, that either husband or wife would be able to 
incur a debt individually or “as an agent for the marital community.” Id. 
Initially, the husband was given full control and dominion over community 
property. By the beginning of the twentieth century, however, the husband’s 
right to unilaterally control such property was, for the most part, greatly 
restricted. Id. Once this happened, it appeared that community property was 
owned by not one, but two. Id. at 391. 
115. Ackerly, supra note 106, at 705. 
116. Id. at 705-06. 
117. Id. at 702; Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, 
at 971. In order for a creditor to reach entirety property, for instance, a 
judgment would have to be obtained against both the bankrupt and the 
bankrupt’s spouse. Ackerly, supra note 106, at 706. 
19
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owning their own property or incurring debts.118 Married 
women, however, were considered “persons” under the 
Bankruptcy Code, as evidenced by an addition in 1938, which 
specified that women were “persons” eligible to file for 
bankruptcy.119 
In 1978, § 302 was added to the Bankruptcy Code, which 
codified the joint bankruptcy petition.120 Section 302 was added 
as part of a larger overhaul of the Code, which occurred in 
large part due to a skyrocketing number of bankruptcies that 
most suspected coincided with the rise of consumer credit.121 
The language of § 302(a) is simple, providing that a debtor may 
file a single petition with his or her “spouse.”122 Section 302(b) 
adds merely that the court will decide the extent of 
consolidation in a joint case.123 The legislative history is also 
quite sparse, but indicates that the joint bankruptcy petition 
was codified due to the fact that spouses are presumed to be 
“jointly liable on their debts” and to “jointly hold most of their 
property” in the “consumer debtor context.”124 It was also 
intended that the joint petition would “facilitate consolidation,” 
and also to promote administrative efficiency by having a 
single proceeding and a single fee.125 In addition, the legislative 
history specifically emphasizes that the consent of both spouses 
 
118. In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 439 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). 
119. Id. at 439 & n.6. 
120. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012); S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
121. SKEEL, supra note 99, at 136. 
122. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a). 
 
A joint case under a chapter of this title is commenced by 
filing with the bankruptcy court of a single petition under 
such chapter by an individual that may be a debtor under 
such chapter and such individual’s spouse. The 
commencement of a joint case under a chapter of this title 
constitutes an order for relief under such chapter. 
 
Id. 
123. Id. at § 302(b) “After the commencement of a joint case, the court 
shall determine the extent, if any, to which the debtor’s estates shall be 
consolidated.” Id. 
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is necessary to file a joint bankruptcy petition.126 Section 302(b) 
is designed specifically for “ease of administration,” and 
permits the court to consolidate the estates of the two 
petitioning debtors.127 The decision to consolidate is based on 
how many of the debts are jointly incurred, how many assets 
are jointly owned, and potentially other factors as a court may 
deem necessary.128 Ultimately, the inclusion of joint cases in 
the Bankruptcy Code was an administrative decision to 
alleviate the burden placed both debtors and the courts.129 
In one sense, § 302 was a hallmark of progress, a signal 
that women had a separate legal identity and that the vestiges 
of coverture which kept women from owning their own property 
were losing their grip.130 According to the court in In re Knobel, 
the “[p]rovision for joint filings under the Bankruptcy Code 
acknowledges the changed times.”131 The court was quick to 
point out that despite the presence of joint filing, a joint 
petition is filed by two individuals, not one.132 The court 
regarded this as significant because it recognized the legal 
identity of both husband and wife, and did not “return us to 
days past.”133 Section 302 is certainly not without its critics, 
however. According to Robert B. Chapman, bankruptcy courts 
are very quick to aggregate the income and expenses of 
married couples filing jointly, and they routinely consolidate 





129. Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, at 975-76; 
Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 90-91 (“Congress awards this 
right to facilitate case administration, not to promote marriage or to 
encourage spouses to support each other.”). 
130. In re Knobel, 167 B.R. 436, 439-40 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1994). 
131. Id. at 440. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. Note that the court here is likely making reference to the effects 
of the doctrine of coverture and not the Bankruptcy Code itself, since it was 
possible for both spouses to file, but other state laws regarding property and 
the doctrine of coverture usually prevented it or made it unnecessary. This 
point is underscored by the fact that in 1938, women were specifically 
enumerated as individuals who could file for bankruptcy under the 
Bankruptcy Code. See supra notes 118-19 and accompanying text. 
134. Robert B. Chapman, Coverture and Cooperation: The Firm, the 
Market, and the Substantive Consolidation of Married Debtors, 17 BANKR. 
21
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doing so, he argues, the bankruptcy courts are once again 
treating husband and wife as a single economic and legal unit 
that is reminiscent of the nineteenth century.135 
Perhaps the greatest criticism of joint filing, however, is 
that it permits spouses to file jointly to the exclusion of those 
who are not spouses. Although the Bankruptcy Code does not 
define who constitutes a spouse, reference is made to 
“husband” and “wife” in both the legislative history of § 302 
and within the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure in 
reference to consolidation.136 Following the recent Supreme 
Court decision in United States v. Windsor, which held § 3 of 
the Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”) unconstitutional, the 
United States Trustees Program adopted the position that such 
terms will be interpreted to apply to same-sex married couples 
as well.137 Nonetheless, it is not difficult to see why the sole 
 
DEV. J. 105, 219 (2000). 
135. Id. 
136. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). Section 302 permits "spouses" to file 
joint bankruptcy petitions. Id. The words "husband" and "wife" are notably 
absent from this section. See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(a) (permitting 
courts to consolidate the estates of "husband and wife."); S. REP. NO. 95-989, 
at 32 (1978). For a more complete discussion of consolidation, see infra notes 
221-30 and accompanying text. 
137. 133 S. Ct. at 2696; Consumer Information, The United States Dep’t 
of Justice, http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/consumer_info/ (last 
visited April 14, 2014). Section 3 of DOMA, which was held unconstitutional 
in Windsor, amended the Dictionary Act to provide that marriage was 
between one man and one woman for federal purposes. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 
2683. Section 2 of DOMA, which permitted the states to refuse to recognize 
same-sex marriages that had been performed in other states, was not 
challenged. Id. Following this decision, the Attorney General issued a 
memorandum to all employees in the Department of Justice in which he 
stated that, “It is the Department’s policy, to the extent federal law permits, 
to recognize lawful same-sex marriages as broadly as possible, and to 
recognize all marriages valid in the jurisdiction where the marriage was 
celebrated.” Memorandum from the Office of the Attorney General to All 
Department Employees (Feb. 10, 2014), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/9201421014257314255.pdf. The 
Department of Justice was instructed by President Obama to work with other 
federal agencies in order to ensure compliance with the Windsor decision. Id. 
Following extensive review, components of the Department of Justice issued 
guidance regarding compliance with Windsor. Id. Among these were the 
United States Trustee Program, which instructed personnel “to apply the 
Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules to same-sex married couples in the 
same manner as they are applied to opposite-sex married couples, and to 
interpret references to marital status in the Code and Rules to cover 
22http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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criteria for joint filing in § 302 – being a spouse – seems 
irrelevant in light of the objectives of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Bankruptcy in itself is said to have two goals: to give debtors 
who file for bankruptcy a “fresh start” and to insure maximum 
debt repayment to a debtor’s creditors.138 The joint petition, in 
contrast, is supposed to relieve the burden on both debtors and 
the courts by streamlining the process for those who 
(supposedly) have a significant number of joint assets.139 
 
IV. The Benefits (or lack thereof) of Filing as One 
 
A. The Implications of Filing a Joint Income Tax Return 
 
Under our current tax regime, marriage can be either a 
blessing or a burden. This is largely due to a dichotomy in 
which some couples receive what is known as a marriage bonus 
or a marriage penalty upon marriage.140 Essentially, couples 
receive a marriage bonus when their overall income tax 
liability is lower following their marriage than the sum of what 
they would have paid in taxes if they were both unmarried.141 A 
penalty results when a married couples’ tax liability increases 
as the result of marriage.142 This difference in the tax liability 
of married couples cannot be attributed to one specific Internal 
Revenue Code provision, but rather results from the 
intersection of different provisions of the Code, which act to 
create a marriage incentive for some but not for others.143 
 
individuals lawfully married under any jurisdiction with the legal authority 
to sanction marriages.” Id. 
138. Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, at 965-66 
(also noting that the promotion of marriage is not surprising in light of the 
promotion of marriage in other areas, including tax policy). 
139. Id. at 975-76; Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 90-91. 
140. Dorothy A. Brown, The Marriage Bonus/Penalty in Black and 




143. Amy C. Christian, Legislative Approaches to Marriage Penalty 
Relief: The Unintended Effects of Change on the Married Couple's Choice of 
Filing Status, 16 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 303, 303-04 (1999) [hereinafter 
Christian, Legislative Approaches]. 
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The marriage penalty or the marriage bonus occurs when a 
couple marries and must pay income tax for the first time since 
their marriage. Although the American income tax system is 
often described as treating the individual as the unit of 
taxation, the scheme set forth by Congress evidences an intent 
to treat the family as the taxable unit.144 Thus, once a couple is 
married, the legal fiction of the marital unit takes effect for 
purposes of income taxation, and treats married couples as if 
they have pooled their income regardless of whether or not they 
actually have.145 Under the regime set forth by Congress in 
1948, this means that when a married couple files jointly, their 
incomes are to be aggregated and split, which results in a tax 
liability that is the same as if each spouse had earned half of 
the aggregated income.146 This essentially shifts income from 
the higher earning to the lower earning spouse.147 
Depending on the relative income of the married couple 
who files jointly, income splitting will contribute significantly 
to producing either a marriage penalty or a marriage bonus. 
Those who receive the greatest advantage in this regime are 
couples with the greatest disparity in their relative income, 
including marriages in which one partner earns no income at 
all.148 When spouses’ relative incomes differ greatly, the 
aggregation and subsequent splitting of their incomes prior to 
the application of joint income tax rates may push the higher-
earning spouse into a lower income tax bracket, which may 
reduce overall tax liability.149 Thus, the tax benefits of joint 
 
144. Anthony C. Infanti, Decentralizing Family: An Inclusive Proposal 
for Individual Tax Filing in the United States, 2010 UTAH L. REV. 605, 611 
(2010). 
145. Lily Kahng, Fiction in Tax, in TAXING AMERICA 28 (Karen B. Brown 
& Mary Louise Fellows eds., 1996). 
146. Bittker, supra note 49, at 1412-13. 
147. Christian, Legislative Approaches, supra note 143, at 303-04. 
148. Deborah A. Widiss, Changing the Marriage Equation, 89 WASH. 
U.L. REV. 721, 749 (2012). There is also evidence to suggest that, generally 
speaking, the burden of the marriage penalty is more likely to fall upon a 
minority household than it is for a nonminority household. For more on this 
subject, see Brown, supra note 140, at 45-57 (describing how the marriage 
penalty affects black versus white families). 
149. Amy C. Christian, Joint Versus Separate Filing: Joint Return Tax 
Rates and Federal Complicity in Directing Economic Resources From Women 
to Men, 6 S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN'S STUD. 443, 448 (1997) [hereinafter 
24http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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filing are the greatest when one spouse earns significantly 
more than the other, allowing a larger portion of income to be 
shifted.150 Dual-earner couples who are both within similar 
income brackets, in contrast, are at risk of either receiving 
little to no benefit or experiencing a marriage penalty.151 As the 
relative incomes of spouses grow closer or approach being 
equal, there is less of an incentive to file jointly.152 Married 
couples that have near-equal incomes are likely to see little 
benefit when their incomes are aggregated and split, since it 
far less likely that the income of the higher-earning spouse 
would fall into a lower tax bracket following this process.153 
Spouses who earn equal incomes will see no benefit from the 
income splitting regime.154 Married taxpayers have never been 
required to file joint returns, and married couples do have the 
option to file separately.155 This does not always cure the 
marriage penalty, however, because married persons filing 
separately must use a certain rate schedule that likewise has 
unfavorable tax rates.156 In addition, married persons are 
ineligible to file as a head of household on their income tax, 
which caused marriage penalties for dual-earner spouses with 
 
Christian, Complicity]. 
150. Id. at 447. 
151. Widiss, supra note 148, at 749. As a simple example, imagine that 
Husband X earns $100,000 per year and Wife X earns no income. Fictitiously 
assuming that there are no other deductions or exemptions, the couple will be 
taxed as if they each earned $50,000. Under the same circumstances, if 
Husband Y earns $60,000 and Wife Y earns $40,000, they will also be taxed 
as if they each earned $50,000. This scenario, however, presumably puts 
Husband X into a much lower tax bracket than Husband Y, and reduces 
Couple X’s overall tax liability. Yet, if Husband Z and Wife Z each earned 
$50,000, neither of them would experience a decrease in tax rate as the result 
of their split income, and certainly no tax benefit. 
152. Christian, Legislative Approaches, supra note 143, at 308-09. 
153. Christian, Complicity, supra note 149, at 447. 
154. Id. 
155. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Wedded to the Joint Return: Culture and 
the Persistence of the Material Unit the American Income Tax, 11 
THEORETICAL INQ. L. 631, 645 (2010). 
156. James M. Puckett, Rethinking Tax Priorities: Marriage Neutrality, 
Children, and Contemporary Families, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1409, 1415-16 
(2010). Compare 26 U.S.C. § 1(a) (2012) (rates for married individuals filing 
joint returns and surviving spouses), with 26 U.S.C. § 1(d) (rates for married 
individuals filing joint returns). 
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a child as early as 1951.157 
A marriage penalty can also be caused by other provisions 
of the Code, however, such as the Earned Income Tax Credit 
(“EITC”). The EITC is available to each taxpayer whether or 
not they file individual or jointly.158 The phase-out amounts for 
a joint income tax return, however, are only slightly higher 
than the amount given to a single filer.159 Thus, if a single 
parent begins a relationship with a new partner, and they 
receive little to no benefit from having their incomes 
aggregated and split, there is a good chance that it will be 
financially advantageous for them to not marry.160 This 
particular source of the marriage penalty falls 
disproportionately on the working classes, for whom the EITC 
was enacted to benefit.161 
Criticisms of the current joint filing tax regime are vast 
and well-documented. Section 6013(a) of the Internal Revenue 
Code specifies that it is only a husband and wife who may file a 
joint return, though such language applies to same-sex married 
couples as well.162 Income tax scholars have noted that our 
 
157. Puckett, supra note 156, at 1415. See also 26 U.S.C. § 1(b) (tax rates 
for head of household); 26 U.S.C. § 2(b) (requirements for head of household 
status, among them being unmarried and maintaining a household as a 
principal place of abode for more than half of the taxable year for a qualifying 
individual, which includes a parent or a child). See also Boyter v. Comm'r, 
668 F.2d 1382, 1383-84 (4th Cir. 1981) (holding that sham transaction 
doctrine may be applicable to married taxpayers who divorced in order to 
avoid marriage penalty). 
158. Christian, Legislative Approaches, supra note 143, at 314-15. 
159. Pamela Gershuny, The Combined Impact of PRWORA, FMLA, IRC, 
FRD, DPPA, and BAPCPA on Single Mothers and Their Children, 18 WM. & 
MARY J. WOMEN & L. 475, 503 & n.188 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 32(b)(2)(A), (B) 
(earned income tax credit). 
160. Gershuny, supra note 159, at 503. 
161. Frederick J. Bradshaw, IV, The Earned Income Tax Credit and the 
Marriage Penalty: New Proposals in Light of the Economic Growth and Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, 54 TAX LAW. 701, 709 (2001). The EITC was 
originally enacted in 1975 in order to offset the burden on the working class 
for paying the Medicare and Social Security payroll taxes. Since the credit is 
based on earned income, it was viewed as an incentive to work at a time 
when welfare reform was becoming a concern. Congress paid special 
attention, however, to providing aid to those working families with dependent 
children. Id. 
162. See 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a). Note that for purposes of this discussion, 
references to “husband” and “wife” are applicable to same-sex couples. The 
26http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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current system, which fictitiously treats a married couple as a 
unit for purposes of taxation, exacerbates the marginalization 
of women in the workforce.163 Women are more likely than men 
to be secondary earners, and the splitting of aggregated income 
causes “the first dollar earned by a secondary worker” to be 
viewed as effectively taxed “at the marginal rate of the primary 
worker.”164 Essentially, this psychological effect results from 
the fact that when incomes are aggregated and split, the tax 
liability of the higher-income spouse is likely to be reduced 
while for the lower-income spouse, the tax liability is likely to 
be increased.165 Indeed, when income splitting took effect in 
1948, it was considered attractive in part because it would 
reinforce traditional gender roles.166 Income splitting allowed 
for the allocation of tax benefits between husband and wife 
without compromising the wife’s supposed duties to her 
household with the concerns of business.167 
Income splitting also perpetuates traditional gender roles 
by virtue of the manner in which benefits are allocated. As 
mentioned earlier, wives are more likely to be secondary 
earners within their marriages.168 When a wife is the primary 
earner in a marriage, however, there is typically less of a 
difference in relative income than when the husband is the 
primary earner.169 Thus, when a wife is the primary earner in 
their dual-earner marriage, the wife is less likely to receive 
 
IRS recently held that due to the Windsor decision and some additional 
considerations, it would now be interpreting gender-specific terms such as 
“husband” or “wife” in a gender-neutral manner that would include same-sex 
spouses. I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. The IRS has also held 
that it will recognize all legally performed same-sex marriages regardless of 
whether or not a same-sex couple who was legally married is domiciled in a 
state that recognizes same-sex marriage. I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 
I.R.B. 201. Even in certain instances, however, being married may not be 
enough. Note, for example, that if one partner is a nonresident alien, 
husband and wife will not be permitted to file jointly. 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a)(1). 
163. Kahng, supra note 145, at 38-39. 
164. Id. at 39. 
165. Christian, Complicity, supra note 149, at 448. 
166. Jones, supra note 88, at 296. 
167. Id. 
168. Martha T. McCluskey, Taxing the Family Work: Aid for Affluent 
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significant benefits from income splitting than if their husband 
was the primary earner.170 In addition, income splitting causes 
a systemic bias in which tax liability is reduced the most when 
one spouse, often the husband, earns much more.171 
By becoming a single taxpaying unit, spouses also consent 
to be jointly and severally liable for each other’s tax liability 
upon the filing of a joint income tax.172 Several arguments have 
been advanced in favor of joint and several liability, including 
that it is a “price” paid for the benefits of a joint tax return.173 
It has also been thought of as administrative necessity, and as 
a mechanism for preventing the unjust enrichment of a non-
delinquent spouse whose partner has understated his or her 
taxes.174 It has the potential, however, to shift liability to a 
non-earning spouse.175 Married couples with the greatest 
disparity in their relative income are those with the greatest 
incentive to file jointly, and those who file jointly will be 
subjected to joint and several liability in the event of 
delinquency.176 Joint and several liability is significantly less 
fair when the spouses incomes differ greatly, since delinquency 
on the part of the higher-earning spouse, who is more likely to 
be the husband, will result in liability being placed on the 
lower-earning spouse, who is more likely to be the wife.177 
According to Amy Christian, this places a wife in a more fragile 
position, since in the event of delinquency, she will be less able 
to absorb the cost.178 Not surprisingly, evidence exists that 
deficiencies are collected more from wives with delinquent 





171. Christian, Legislative Approaches, supra note 143, at 313. 
172. Amy C. Christian, Joint and Several Liability and the Joint Return: 
Its Implications for Women, 66 U. CIN. L. REV. 535, 540-50 (1998) [hereinafter 
Christian, Joint and Several Liability]. 
173. Id. at 545. 
174. Id. at 545-46. 
175. Id. 
176. Id. at 605. 
177. Id. 
178. Christian, Joint and Several Liability, supra note 172, at 605. 
179. Id. at 536. 
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B. The Implications of Filing a Joint Bankruptcy Petition 
 
The typical consumer bankruptcy today is filed as a 
Chapter 7 liquidation or a Chapter 13 repayment.180 In a 
Chapter 7 case, a debtor receives a discharge of his or her debts 
in exchange for turning over all non-exempt assets for sale.181 
The discharge takes place after the petition has filed and the 
time to object to discharge has passed.182 In contrast, a debtor 
in a Chapter 13 repayment enters into a three or five year plan 
in which the debtor agrees to payments that will satisfy 
priority claims and compensate creditors for the amounts that 
they would have otherwise been able to receive in a Chapter 7 
liquidation.183 The discharge in a Chapter 13 case, however, 
does not take place until the completion of the plan.184 One of 
the purposes of the 1978 revisions was to encourage debtors to 
choose a Chapter 13 repayment instead of a Chapter 7 
liquidation in order to provide compensation to creditors.185 
Perhaps the most attractive aspect of a Chapter 13 repayment 
is that a debtor gets to retain his or her property and assets.186 
 
180. See AM. BANKR. INST., Annual Non-Business Filings by Chapter (07-
11), available at 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/AMTemplate.cfm?Section=Home&TEMPLATE=
/CM/ContentDisplay.cfm&CONTENTID=65197 (This table depicts the 
number of non-business filings in each state and territory for the years 2007 
to 2011 for Chapters 7, 11, and 13. Notice that the number of Chapter 7 and 
Chapter 13 filings are significantly greater than those filed under Chapter 
11). It is important to keep in mind, however, that it can be difficult to 
determine when bankruptcies are "strictly business" or "strictly consumer" 
since "consumers" may actually be discharging business debts, especially if 
they own small businesses. Robert M. Lawless, A Few Recent Developments in 
the Bankruptcies of Small Businesses and Their Owners, 29 No. 1 BANKR. L. 
LETTER 1 (2009). 
181. Susan L. DeJarnatt, Once Is Not Enough: Preserving Consumers’ 
Rights to Bankruptcy Protection, 74 IND. L.J. 455, 459 (1999). 
182. Robert J. Bein, Subjectivity, Good Faith, and the Expanded Chapter 
13 Discharge, 70 MO. L. REV. 655, 659 (2005) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 707(a) 
(2012)). 
183. DeJarnatt, supra note 181, at 459. 
184. Bein, supra note 182, at 659 (citing 11 U.S.C. § 1329(a)). 
185. DeJarnatt, supra note 181, at 458-59. 
186. James Winston Kim, Saving Our Future: Why Voluntary 
Contributions to Retirement Accounts are Reasonable Expenses, 26 EMORY 
BANKR. DEV. J. 341, 351 (2010) (discussing Chapter 13) (citing 11 U.S.C. § 
1322). For information on how Chapter 13 bankruptcies affect home 
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Non-business debtors are permitted to file a Chapter 11 
reorganization,187 but to do so is much more expensive.188 They 
may have to file in Chapter 11, however, if the debts incurred 
exceed the limits set forth under Chapter 13.189 
In 2005, a series of amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
were enacted under the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and 
Consumer Protection Act (“BAPCPA”).190 Under the BAPCPA, 
a case may be dismissed or converted with the consent of the 
debtor into a Chapter 11 or Chapter 13 case if found to be “an 
abuse of the provisions of this chapter.”191 A presumption of 
abuse is found whenever the debtor cannot pass the rigid and 
formulaic means test in § 707(b)(2).192 The means test is long 
and convoluted, but essentially requires that the above-median 
income debtor reduce certain allowed expenses by his or her 
monthly income in order to see how much “disposable income” 
remains.193 The below median-income debtor does not suffer 
from this presumption of abuse and does not have to be 
subjected to the means test.194 Regardless of whether or not 
 
mortgage foreclosures, see generally Susan E. Hauser, Cutting the Gordian 
Knot: The Case for Allowing Modification of Home Mortgages in Bankruptcy, 
5 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 207 (2010). 
187. Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 165-66 (1991) (holding that an 
individual debtor is not precluded from filing under Chapter 11). 
188. Bruce A. Markell, The Sub Rosa Subchapter: Individual Debtors in 
Chapter 11 After BAPCPA, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 67, 79 (2007). 
189. Id.; 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012) (setting forth applicable debt 
limitations). 
190. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 
2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23. 
191. 11 U.S.C. §707(b)(1) (2012). 
192. § 707(b)(2); Mark A. Neal & Sandra Mannochio, Means Testing: The 
Heart of the BAPCPA, 40 MD. B. J. 26, 27 (2007). Although the formula set 
forth in § 707(b)(2) is quite mechanical, there is some indication that the 
formula may be relaxing. In Hamilton, for example, the Supreme Court held 
that the petitioner, who had received a “one-time buyout” from a former 
employer, did not have to include this amount when calculating her 
"projected disposable income" under the means-testing analysis. Hamilton v. 
Lanning, 560 U.S. 505, 511, 524 (2010). Had this amount been included, it 
would have caused the amount of her average monthly income to artificially 
inflate despite meeting the mechanical requirements of the formula. Id. at 
511-12. 
193. Neal & Mannochio, supra note 192, at 27. 
194. David Gray Carlson, Means Testing: The Failed Bankruptcy 
Revolution of 2005, 15 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 223, 307 (2007). 
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debtors are above or below median income status, all are 
subjected to the definition of “current monthly income” found in 
§ 101(10A) when determining disposable income, which defines 
monthly income as income from nearly any source to the debtor 
or the debtor’s spouse.195 
Despite any additional hardships placed on above-median 
income couples under the BAPCPA, couples will generally 
benefit from jointly petitioning for bankruptcy if they so choose. 
Although there are many advantages to filing jointly, it is 
unlikely that one jointly filing couple would be able to benefit 
from all of the possible advantages.196 There are some 
advantages, however, that all couples should be able to benefit 
from. For one, jointly filing spouses only need to pay one single 
filing fee.197 In addition, the joint petition helps spouses save on 
the more significant cost of having to pay additional legal 
fees.198 Any ability to save money during the bankruptcy 
process is of great benefit to debtors who have limited income 
to spend on the costs associated with bankruptcy.199 These 
savings are particularly significant in recent years, since the 
cost of filing for bankruptcy has skyrocketed upwards, largely 
in part to the additional costs associated with the BAPCPA.200 
The BAPCPA imposed additional requirements on those filing 
for bankruptcy, which has made the process of filing for 
bankruptcy more involved, and the fees associated with it more 
expensive.201 In addition, the joint bankruptcy petition has the 
 
195. 11 U.S.C. § 101(10A) (2012); Carlson, supra note 194, at 301. For 
more information on the means testing analysis, see infra notes 331-32 and 
accompanying text. 
196. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 89-90. 
197. Chapman, supra note 134, at 136. Currently, the filing fee for a 
Chapter 7 liquidation is $306.00 while the cost of a Chapter 13 repayment is 
$281.00. These costs are the same whether or not one files an individual or 
joint case with the court. See Filing Fees List, U.S. BANKR. COURT: S.D.N.Y, 
http://www.nysb.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/filingFees2012.pdf (last 
modified Nov. 21, 2012) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1930 (2012)). 
198. Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, at 975-76. 
199. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 91. 
200. See Blake Ellis, Too Broke to Go Bankrupt, CNN MONEY (May 7, 
2012, 6:55 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2012/05/07/pf/bankruptcy-
costs/index.htm. 
201. Id. See also Christine Dugas, Tax Refunds Being Used to Pay for 
Bankruptcy Filings, USA TODAY, 
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advantage of convenience for a married couple. If one spouse is 
capable of providing all relevant financial information to the 
court, the court will often excuse the other spouse from 
attending proceedings.202 This provides an additional financial 
benefit to joint debtors since it translates into less time lost 
from work.203 
For married couples who opt to file jointly and meet 
eligibility requirements, filing a joint bankruptcy petition is a 
right.204 No other relationship, except for marriage, gives rise 
to the right to file a joint bankruptcy petition.205 For a Chapter 
13 case, only one spouse needs to be eligible under § 109(e), 
which states that an individual have “regular income” and 
provides for the maximum debt ceiling.206 Even if spouses do 
not elect to file a joint petition, however, and only one spouse 
files for bankruptcy, there are still additional benefits. For one, 
the debts of one spouse are not imputed to the other, which 
means that one spouse can file bankruptcy for incurred debts 
and the other non-filing spouse does not have any liability for 
the debt and can even be protected from debt collection 
activities.207 A bankrupt spouse may also deduct reasonable 
amounts necessary to support their non-bankrupt spouse when 
calculating their allowable exemption amount under § 
522(d)(1).208 Section 522(d)(1) allows a debtor to deduct 
amounts necessary to support dependents, and according to § 




refund-filing-for-bankruptcy/54227664/1 (last updated Apr. 13, 2012). The 
average cost of filing for bankruptcy jumped from $921 in 2005 to $1477 in 
2007. Id. Evidence exists that individuals are using their tax refunds to help 
pay for this cost. Id. The irony, of course, is that the BAPCPA was originally 
enacted in order to curb alleged abuse of the bankruptcy system, but it raised 
the cost of filing for bankruptcy significantly, making it so those with more 
wealth could most afford it. Id. 
202. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 91. 
203. Id. 
204. Id. at 90. 
205. Chapman, supra note 134, at 137. 
206. 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (2012); Chapman, supra note 134, at 135-36. 
207. Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, at 963-64. 
208. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d)(1) (2012). 
209. § 522(a), (d)(1). 
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Married debtors may also have additional advantages if 
they live in a state that still recognizes tenancy by the 
entireties. Although entirety laws have existed in forty states, 
some states have opted to do away with entirety laws or else 
restrict them in some way, such as by requiring the expression 
of intent to form a tenancy by the entirety as opposed to having 
such an estate form automatically.210 Entirety laws were once 
enacted for shielding the family assets from squandering 
husbands when coverture was still a strong doctrine.211 Even 
today, however, with the doctrine of coverture significantly 
eroded, entirety laws can prove a strong force for keeping 
assets intact. Section 522(b)(1)(B) recognizes entirety property 
as exempt as to the extent of non-bankruptcy law.212 In a 
majority of states that recognize entirety property, for instance, 
a creditor must have a claim against both spouses in order to 
seize entirety assets.213 Furthermore, in order to seize non-
exempt entirety property (such as a home) and sell it without 
the consent of a co-owner and non-debtor spouse, the trustee 
must show that: “(1) the property cannot be easily partitioned; 
(2) selling only the estate’s interest would yield significantly 
less than selling the property free of the non-debtor spouse’s 
interest; and (3) the benefit (to the debtor’s bankruptcy estate) 
of selling the home outweighs the harm to the non-debtor 
spouse.”214 Trustees are often not able to seize and sell a home 
due to the third requirement, since it will certainly cause 
significant detriment to take the home of a co-owning non-
debtor spouse, especially if the spouse does not work and is a 
 
210. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 94 n.138. 
211. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text. 
212. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b)(1)(B) (also recognizing property held in joint 
tenancy as potentially exempt as well). 
213. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 95. 
214. Id. at 96. See also 11 U.S.C. § 363 (it is also required that the 
property is not “used in the production, transmission, or distribution, for sale, 
of electric energy or of natural or synthetic gas for heat, light, or power”). 
Section 363 requires going through these steps for any property interest with 
a co-owner, but the literature in this area largely focuses on the effect of § 
363 upon entirety property. See Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 
96; Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, at 980-82; Tiffany 
R. Harper, Gelding the Lily: How the Bankruptcy Code's Promotion of 
Marriage Leaves It Impotent, 28 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 31, 36-37 (2011). 
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homemaker.215 
Although for the most part joint bankruptcy petitions are 
treated similarly to individual petitions, they are treated 
differently for purposes of joint administration and 
consolidation.216 Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure authorizes the court to order a joint 
administration of the estates when a husband and wife file for 
bankruptcy.217 Joint administration is a “procedural tool” which 
permits the court to consolidate by combining notices to 
creditors, using a single docket, or the “joint handling of other 
purely administrative matters” in cases where the interested 
parties significantly overlap.218 Interestingly enough, the tool of 
joint administration is not limited to cases of husband and 
wife, but may also be used in partnerships or affiliated 
corporations.219 When used in cases of husband and wife, 
however, joint administration requires that spouses elect the 
same exemptions within a reasonable time set by the court, or 
else the court will deem the spouses to have elected the same 
exemptions under § 522(b)(1).220 
In addition, filing jointly allows for the facilitation of 
consolidation of estates where spouses have jointly incurred 
their debts and property.221 Consolidation does not happen 
automatically, but rather is facilitated by   § 302(b).222 Once a 
married couple files a joint petition with the bankruptcy court, 
under § 302(b), “the court shall determine the extent, if any, to 
which the debtors’ estates shall be consolidated.”223 
Consolidation is “an extraordinary form of [bankruptcy] relief 
that generally eliminates debtors’ otherwise separate identities 
 
215. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 96. 
216. 11 U.S.C. § 302(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b); Chapman, supra note 
134, at 141 (noting that for the most part, joint cases are treated much the 
same as individual cases). 
217. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). Such references to “husband” and “wife” 
apply to same-sex married couples as well. See supra note 137. 
218. Chapman, supra note 134, at 140-41 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
219. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(e). 
220. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(e). 
221. Chapman, supra note 134, at 137-38. 
222. 11 U.S.C. § 302(b) (2012); Chapman, supra note 134, at 137-38. 
223. 11 U.S.C. § 302(b). 
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for purposes of their bankruptcies and permits recovery of 
debts from enterprises rather than entities.”224 Consolidation is 
a form of relief that was originally used in the corporate 
bankruptcy context, and can be thought of as akin to piercing 
the corporate veil.225 Thus, although consolidation is extremely 
important when considering the joint bankruptcy petition, it is 
not limited only to the joint bankruptcy context.226 
Consolidation can be a drastic remedy depending on the 
assets and liabilities of each spouse involved. Not all spouses 
who file a joint bankruptcy petition will have incurred debts in 
equal proportions, and may have different ratios of assets to 
liabilities.227 For example, a husband may be determined to be 
unable to pay back his debts following consolidation, due to his 
debt becoming pooled with his wife’s liabilities.228 Assets also 
become essentially redistributed between the partners 
following consolidation, and it has the potential to deprive each 
spouse of enforceable interests held in individually titled assets 
such as earnings.229 Although the determination to consolidate 
is a matter of the court’s discretion and the Bankruptcy Code 
facilitates consolidation as opposed to mandating it, some 
districts provide for automatic consolidation while others do so 
as a matter of routine.230 
 
V. The Relevancy of Our Current System and the Case for 
Change 
 
A. The Changing Demographics of the American Household 
 
Culturally speaking, it does seem that our treatment of 
married versus unmarried persons for joint filing purposes is 
quite out of touch with the relational demographics of 
American society. Marriage rates have been on a steady 
 
224. Chapman, supra note 134, at 142-43. 
225. Id. at 143-44. 
226. Id. at 144. See also FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(a) (authorizing 
consolidation of multiple petitions arising from an individual debtor). 
227. Chapman, supra note 134, at 146-47. 
228. Id. at 147-48. 
229. Id. at 146-47. 
230. Id. at 148-51. 
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decline, while cohabitation rates have been on the rise.231 
According to the Pew Research Center, “[t]he recent decline in 
the number of Americans getting married shows no signs of 
reversing.”232 This is not to say that Americans do not value 
marriage or do not have marriage as a goal. According to one 
survey, approximately six in ten Americans wish to get married 
at some point in their lives.233 Furthermore, when prompted on 
the reasons for marriage, and overwhelming majority of 
Americans cited love as their main motivating factor while less 
than one third cited financial stability.234 This “romantic ideal,” 
however, is not resulting in more marriages.235 Only fifty-one 
percent of American adults were married in the year 2011, 
which represents “an all-time low.”236 In the year 1960, that 
same number would have been seventy-two percent.237 A more 
accurate view of this decline occurs, however, once one 
examines not only the percentage of those who are married, but 
the percentage of those Americans who were never married. 
Although seventy-one percent of Americans were married in 
the year 1960, only fifteen percent were never married at all.238 
In 2010, twenty-eight percent of Americans were never 
married, and the number of those who were divorced climbed 
from five percent in the year 1960 to fourteen percent in the 
 
231. Harper, supra note 214, at 39-42. 
232. Richard Fry, No Reversal in Decline of Marriage, PEW RES.: SOC. & 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Nov. 20, 2012), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/11/20/no-reversal-in-decline-of-
marriage/ [hereinafter Fry, Decline of Marriage]. 
233. D’Vera Cohn, Love and Marriage, PEW RES.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC 
TRENDS (Feb. 13, 2013), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/02/13/love-and-
marriage/ [hereinafter Cohn, Love and Marriage]. 
234. Id. Ninety-three percent of married individuals and eighty-four 
percent of unmarried individuals view love as an important reason to get 
married, while only thirty percent of married individuals and thirty-one 
percent of unmarried individuals believe that financial stability is an 
important reason to get married. Id. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. D’Vera Cohn ET AL., New Marriages Down 5% From 2009 to 2010: 
Barely Half of U.S. Adults are Married – A Record Low, PEW RES.: SOC. & 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1, 1 (Dec. 14, 2011), available at 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/12/Marriage-Decline.pdf 
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year 2010.239 
A number of factors may be contributing to this decline. 
Since the 1950s, there had generally been a gap in the 
marriage rates between those who had a college education and 
those who did not, with the college educated marrying at a rate 
slightly higher than their non-college educated counterparts.240 
This trend, however, has been reversing, and while marriage 
rates among men seem to be correlated still with their relative 
education levels, women are just as likely to marry regardless 
of whether or not they have obtained a college degree.241 Even 
after taking education into account, married adults still earn 
more than their unmarried counterparts, with married couples 
lacking a college education earning thirty-four percent more 
than their similarly situated unmarried counterparts in the 
year 2008.242 Those without a college education, however, are 
slightly more likely to see their marriages end in divorce.243 
Overall, however, divorce plays less of a role than it used to in 
the decline of marriage rates, as the numbers of divorce have 
stabilized during the past two decades.244 Although some point 
to the recent economic recession as a cause of decline, efforts to 
link the continuing decline in marriage rates to the recession 
have proved problematic, as it has been difficult to show that 
the recession has caused marriage rates to decline, as opposed 
 
239. Id. The difference between these two statistics is due to the change 
in widowed and divorced or separated adults. In 1960, five percent of 
American adults were divorced and separated, and this grew to fourteen 
percent in the year 2010. Approximately nine percent of adults were widowed 
in the year 1960, however, and this shrunk to six percent in the year 2010. 
Id. 
240. Richard Fry, The Reversal of the College Marriage Gap, PEW RES.: 
SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Oct. 7, 2010), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2010/10/07/the-reversal-of-the-college-
marriage-gap/ [hereinafter Fry, Marriage Gap]. 
241. Id. This is significant since women used to be less likely to marry if 
they obtained an education. College educated men, although delaying 
marriage, are just as likely to get married as those who have not yet obtained 
an education. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. Id. “[I]n 2008, 2.9% of all married adults ages 35-39 who lacked a 
college diploma saw their first marriage end in divorce in the prior year, 
compared with just 1.6% of a comparably aged group that had a college 
education.” Id. 
244. Cohn, New Marriages Down, supra note 237, at 3. 
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to a mere correlation.245  
Other factors, however, may have a role here. The overall 
age at which one gets married has been rising.246 Evidence also 
supports a racial gap in marriage rates, with Caucasians 
experiencing much higher rates of marriage than their African 
American counterparts.247 Public attitudes towards marriage, 
however, have significantly changed. Approximately thirty-
nine percent of Americans believe that marriage is becoming 
obsolete, a figure which is up approximately eleven percent 
since the 1970s.248 Among those aged eighteen to twenty-nine, 
however, that figure becomes approximately forty-four 
percent.249 Although many hold this belief, it does not 
necessarily correlate with their own personal wishes of 
whether or not they want to marry themselves.250 Due to this 
conflict in research concerning declining marriage rates, the 
Pew Research Center has determined that it is difficult to 
determine whether or not young Americans “are abandoning 
marriage or merely delaying it.”251 
Alongside the decline in marriage rates, however, is the 
rise in nontraditional family structures. Generally speaking, 
the American public no longer sees marriage as necessary to 
the formation of a family.252 In 2010, approximately half or 
 
245. Cohn, Love and Marriage, supra note 233. 
246. Cohn, New Marriages Down, supra note 237, at 2. 
247. Id. at 8. 
248. Id. at 10. 
249. Id. at 11. 
250. Id. 
251. Id. at 2. 
252. PEW RES. CTR., The Decline of Marriage and Rise of New Families, 




Fully 86% say a single parent and child constitute a family; 
nearly as many (80%) say an unmarried couple living 
together with a child is a family; and 63% say a gay or 
lesbian couple raising a child is a family. The presence of 
children clearly matters in these definitions. If a cohabiting 
couple has no children, a majority of the public says they 
are not a family. Marriage matters, too. If a childless couple 
is married, 88% consider them to be a family. 
38http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
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more Americans stated that “there is no difference between 
being married or single in the ease of having a fulfilling sex 
life, being financially secure, finding happiness, getting ahead 
in a career or having social status.”253 Rates of cohabitation 
have doubled since the 1990s, and the proportion of adults who 
will cohabitate at some point in their lives have similarly 
grown.254 Seventeen states and the District of Columbia have 
also legalized gay marriage, with another three states offering 
some form of civil union or domestic partnerships.255 Other, 
perhaps less discussed, “nontraditional” families are also 
forming. In the wake of the Great Recession, multigenerational 
households experienced a new revitalization, as individuals 
experiencing economic hardship moved in with their 
relatives.256 In the year 2009, there were approximately fifty-
one million Americans living in multigenerational households, 
an increase from forty-two million in the year 2000, and thirty-
two million in 1940.257 Approximately three in ten young adults 
aged twenty-five to thirty-four now comprise the “Boomerang 




253. Cohn, Love and Marriage, supra note 233. 
254. Richard Fry & D’Vera Cohn, Living Together: The Economics of 
Cohabitation, PEW RES.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS 1, 1 (Jun. 27, 2011), 
available at http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/2011/06/pew-social-trends-
cohabitation-06-2011.pdf. 
255. States, Freedom to Marry, http://www.freedomtomarry.org/states/ 
(last visited April 14, 2014). As of April 2014; Maine, New Hampshire, 
Vermont, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecticut, New York, New Jersey, 
Delaware, Maryland, Illinois, Iowa, Minnesota, New Mexico, California, 
Washington, Hawaii, and the District of Columbia have legalized gay 
marriage. Id. Colorado has civil unions for same-sex partnerships. In Your 
State: Marriage and Relationships, Lambda Legal, 
http://www.lambdalegal.org/states-regions (last visited April 14, 2014) 
(providing interactive map of state legal protections for LGBT people and 
their families). Oregon and Nevada have domestic partnerships. Id. 
Wisconsin also recognizes domestic partnerships, but they are very restrictive 
in regard to the domestic partnerships and civil unions of other states. Id. 
256. Rakesh Kochhar & D’Vera Cohn, Fighting Poverty in a Bad 
Economy, Americans Move in With Relatives, PEW RES.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC 
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poor economy.258 Due to increased longevity, approximately one 
in seven adults also now provide support for both an aging 
parent and a child.259 Now, over four in ten American adults 
also have a “step” relative included in their family.260 
The histories of the joint income tax and the joint 
bankruptcy petition, however, demonstrate that the promotion 
of marriage is tangential to the joint filing regime, if related at 
all.261 The income splitting regime was undoubtedly influenced 
by a preference for traditional gender roles,262 and the debate 
over the joint income tax was intertwined with a much larger 
debate over the roles of husbands and wives.263 The decision to 
effect an income splitting regime in 1948, however, was also 
heavily influenced by a desire to have uniform laws among the 
states264 and to place an end to the rather creative devices that 
husbands employed in an attempt to assign income to their 
wives to lower their tax liability.265 The decision to add the 
joint petition to a newly revitalized Bankruptcy Code, however, 
was a matter of little debate at the time of its enactment.266 
The scant legislative history demonstrates that its enactment 
was the result of a combination of the presumption that 
 
258. Kim Parker, The Boomerang Generation: Feeling OK About Living 
With Mom and Dad, PEW RES.: SOC. & DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Mar. 15, 2012), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2012/03/15/the-boomerang-generation/. 
259. Kim Parker & Eileen Patten, The Sandwich Generation: Rising 
Financial Burdens for Middle Aged Americans, PEW RES.: SOC. & 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Jan. 30, 2013), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2013/01/30/the-sandwich-generation/. Adults 
caught in the middle of this generational phenomenon are now aptly named 
“the Sandwich Generation.” Id. 
260. PEW RES. CTR., A Portrait of Stepfamilies, PEW RES.: SOC. & 
DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS (Jan. 13, 2011), 
http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2011/01/13/a-portrait-of-stepfamilies/. 
261. See supra Parts II and III. 
262. Jones, supra note 88, at 296. 
263. See Kessler-Harris, supra note 60, at 333-36. 
264. Gann, supra note 83, at 18. According to McMahon & Zelenak, a 
desire for national uniformity was actually the primary motivation for the 
joint taxing regime enacted by Congress in 1948. Martin A. McMahon, Jr. & 
Lawrence A. Zelenak, ¶ 44.02 Filing Status – Separate, Joint, and Head of 
Household Returns, in FED. INC. TAX’N OF INDIV. ¶ 44.02 (2d ed. 2012). 
265. See McMahon, supra note 48, at 731. 
266. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 91 (noting the "scant 
legislative history" regarding the passage of § 302). 
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husbands and wives pooled their incomes and resources, and 
the desire to ease the financial burden on the courts and 
debtors by facilitating the administration of cases.267 
Both the decrease in marriage rates and the rise of 
nontraditional family structures result in fewer individuals 
being able to take advantage of the financial benefits accorded 
to spouses under the current tax and bankruptcy regimes.268 
Therefore, it is imperative that the bankruptcy and tax 
systems are re-evaluated in light of their objectives, not simply 
to make them less antiquated, but to modernize them so that 
they may be more efficient and useful. The objectives of the 
joint bankruptcy regime are simple. Congress enacted § 302 
with the intent that the joint bankruptcy petition relieve the 
burden placed on debtors, the courts, and to facilitate case 
administration of spouses (due to the presumption that they 
each owned joint assets).269 This makes sense, especially in 
light of the fact that the goals of the bankruptcy system as a 
whole are to provide debtors with “a ‘fresh start’ and ensure 
that all similarly situated creditors receive maximum debt 
repayment.”270 As mentioned earlier, however, the joint income 
tax history is fraught with debate that involved both concern 
for national uniformity and debate over the relative roles of 
husbands and wives.271 Neither of these objectives are 
particularly relevant today given the presence of dual-earner 
couples, the rise of nontraditional family structures, and the 
“nationalization” of the joint income tax in the year 1948.272 
Although the joint income tax was not explicitly founded on the 
presumption that married couples who file joint tax returns 
pool their resources, the presumption that married couples pool 
their resources and thus should be permitted to file a joint tax 
return is considered one of the “principal after-the-fact 
justification[s]” for permitting the continuation of the joint 
 
267. Id.; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
268. See supra notes 231-60 and accompanying text. 
269. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
270. Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) Pay, supra note 107, at 965. 
271. Gann, supra note 83, at 18; Jones, supra note 88, at 296; McMahon 
& Zelenak, supra note 264, at ¶ 44.02[2]. 
272. See supra notes 231-60 and accompanying text; Gann, supra note 
83, at 18. 
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income tax.273 The joint income tax, however, did provide a 
greater benefit to Americans when it was first enacted than it 
does today, due to the fact that more Americans lived in 
traditional family structures that were more likely to be 
composed of a dependent wife and working husband than 
marriages today.274 Thus, this Comment proposes that a 
modern and efficient system of joint income taxation provide 
the greatest benefit to those in interdependent relationships. 
The goal of this Comment is to articulate a unit which 
would satisfy the policy objectives mentioned above yet still 
accommodate nontraditional family structures. In the end, two 
alternatives present themselves as remedies to a marriage-
based filing system. The preferential treatment of the married 
could be completely eradicated by making the individual the 
sole unit of taxation and abolishing the joint bankruptcy 
petition. Alternatively, the unit could be based on an economic 
non-marital determination that would allow those who are in 
interdependent yet nontraditional dyadic relationships to 
participate in the joint filing system. Both would minimize the 
discrimination that occurs among the married versus the 
unmarried, yet both also have their own unique benefits and 
negative implications. Ultimately, however, this Comment will 
demonstrate that adoption of a strictly individual or modified 
individual system in the United States would be less feasible 
and would likely result in significant inequities to those in 
nontraditional relationships without significant overhaul, 
while a system which is based off of the relative economic 
interdependence of citizens will achieve the most equitable 
result in the most feasible manner. 
 
273. Infanti, supra note 144, at 614. 
274. In 1975, approximately forty-seven percent of women with children 
under the age of eighteen participated in the labor force, and in the year 
2008, this number rose to seventy-one percent. Labor Force Participation 
Rates Among Mothers, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.: BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. (May 7, 
2010), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2010/ted_20100507.htm. Dual-earner 
families comprised fifty-eight percent of married couples in 2007, compared 
with only forty-seven percent of married couples in 1967. Women in the Labor 
Force: A Databook, U.S. DEP'T OF LAB.: BUREAU OF LAB. STATS. 1, 2, 76 tbl. 23 
(Sept. 2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/cps/wlf-databook-2009.pdf. In 
2007, male breadwinner families in which only the husband worked 
comprised eighteen percent of married couples, while in 1967, this figure was 
thirty-six percent. Id. 
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B. The Individual as the Sole Economic Unit 
 
The first practical alternative to according preferential 
treatment to married couples would be to have a strictly 
individual system in which the individual is the sole economic 
unit.275 Each individual would file an individual tax return and 
each individual that filed for bankruptcy would do so alone. 
The main advantage to this system, obviously, is a very basic 
sense of equity – no difference in treatment is to be accorded 
based on marital status alone, and the preferential treatment 
of married persons no longer operates to the exclusion of 
others.276 Equity, however, can be a fluid concept, and a strictly 
individual system which does not at least recognize the 
interdependent relationships that exist in society can actually 
be just as inequitable, if not more, than a system which only 
recognizes one interdependent relationship.277 
The notion that a strictly individual system will inevitably 
cause great inequity is especially apparent after examining the 
work of Anthony Infanti and his analysis of the Canadian Tax 
System.278 Infanti does argue for an individual system, but 
acknowledges that an individual filing system is “only a 
starting point for fashioning a tax system that decentralizes 
family.”279 Thus, an individual filing system that produces 
equitable results, according to Infanti, must take into 
consideration not only the individual, but the economic 
relationships the individual enters into.280 The advantages of 
this system, according to Infanti, are the decentralization of 
family, and recognition of interdependent relationships that 
 
275. Dorothy A. Brown, Race, Class, and Gender Essentialism in Tax 
Literature: The Joint Return, 54 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1469, 1508-09 (1997). 
276. Id. (noting that abolition of the joint return, however, may not 
resolve the class, race, and gender biases that cause some commentators to 
want to abolish the joint return in favor of an individual filing system in the 
first instance). See also Infanti, supra note 144, at 621-22 (noting that many 
commentators advocate for the imposition of an individual filing system yet 
give little attention to its design). 
277. LAW COMM'N OF CAN., supra note 1, at 36. 
278. See generally Infanti, supra note 144. 
279. Id. at 621. 
280. Id. at 639. 
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are based on actual taxpayer behavior.281 A system that is 
completely individual and does not give recognition to the 
actual relationships that individuals form runs the risk of 
producing significant inequities. Such a system would assume 
that all Americans are “atomistic individuals” and would “serve 
only to impede the development of the economic dimension of 
personal relationships.”282 It would also be significantly biased 
in that it would favor those who are the most individualistic 
and least connected to others financially.283 Infanti likewise 
recognizes that since taxation is transactional—concerning 
itself with the “economic aspects of transactions between 
individuals”—it makes sense to organize a system around the 
“economic dimension[s]” of the transactions that individuals 
enter into.284 Such recognition, according to Infanti, will ensure 
that the tax system does not impede the development of 
interpersonal relationships.285 A similar argument can easily 
be made in the bankruptcy context, since bankruptcy courts 
regularly have to recognize economic aspects of relationships 
when determining dependency,286 and § 302 was enacted in 
part on an assumption of the pooling of resources between 
spouses.287 
It is clear from Infanti’s analysis that in order to avoid the 
inequities that would arise from a completely individualized 
system, some form of recognition must be given to 
relationships.288 The Canadian Income Tax Act (“ITA”) requires 
each taxpayer to file an individual income tax return under a 
progressive rate schedule.289 This system, however, was not 
always universally accepted, and indeed there has been 
significant debate in Canada over whether or not to adopt a 
 
281. Id. at 609. 
282. Id. at 609-10 n.14. 
283. Id. 
284. Infanti, supra note 144, at 609 n.13. 
285. Id. 
286. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a), (d)(1) (2012); Erin K. Healy, It Depends: 
Prioritizing Function Over Form to Evaluate a Debtor’s Dependency 
Relationships in Consumer Bankruptcy, 22 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 185, 186 
(2005). 
287. 11 U.S.C. § 302; S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
288. Infanti, supra note 144, at 609. 
289. Id. at 623. 
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joint filing system.290 Nonetheless, the Canadian tax system 
cannot be fairly characterized as strictly individual, and 
resembles more of an individual system with significant 
modifications.291 Although Canadian citizens file individual tax 
returns, they must still indicate their marital status.292 Yet 
Canada is also many steps ahead of America insofar as 
recognizing nontraditional family structures, which includes 
both gay marriage and cohabiting relationships (otherwise 
known as “common-law partner[s]”).293 It is important to note, 
however, that Canada also has the most restrictive laws 
regulating the assignment of income, which helps to prevent 
the income splitting that has been so controversial in 
America.294 Even with such restrictive laws against assignment 
of income, Canada has still suffered from a different form of 
“marriage” or “family” penalty, due to various phase-outs that 
occur when one indicates that they are married or common-law 
partners on their tax returns.295 When the Law Commission of 
Canada published its recommendations for various legal 
reforms in 2001, it thus recommended that those reforming the 
law keep in mind not only the objectives of the law in 
particular, but the relationships that exists and how they can 
best comport with such legal reforms.296 
It appears that a Canadian modified individual tax regime 
is more equitable than the current American tax regime in the 
sense that an individual is not defined by his or her marital 
status and has benefits allocated accordingly. It is likewise 
clear, however, that much of this equity derives not from the 
Canadian system of taxation per se, but from the fact that 
Canada is more accommodating of nontraditional family 
structures than the United States. In a vein reminiscent of the 
United States, Canadian citizens must also still designate some 
 
290. Id. 
291. Id. at 625. 
292. Id. at 624. 
293. Id. 
294. Infanti, supra note 144, at 630. Note, however, that there are 
certain exceptions allowing assignment of income between partners, even in 
Canada. See id. at 633. 
295. See id. at 625. 
296. Id. at 639-40. 
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sort of “status” on their tax returns, whether in the form of 
marriage or other form of conjugal relationship, and are still at 
risk of suffering a penalty from such a designation.297 These 
factors suggest that a Canadian-style system of taxation would 
likely need a significant overhaul in order to effectively 
transfer to the United States in a manner that would not 
produce or mimic the inequity currently placed on those living 
in nontraditional family structures. 
Thus, a Canadian-style system of taxation would likely 
suffer from an inherent lack of practicality and complexity in 
the American context. Infanti is quick to point out that an 
adoption of an individual tax system in the United States is not 
“politically unrealistic” and points to the effective transition of 
Sweden from a joint to an individual system as an example of 
its possibility.298 Surely, such a transition is possible in the 
United States. Yet the United States suffers from two 
conditions that decrease the feasibility of a modified individual 
system, or at least one that is sufficiently equitable. The first is 
that among other industrial democracies, the United States is 
unusual in that it is comparatively marked by a lack of social 
services to its citizens, relying on private individuals to form 
their own safety net.299 The second is that the family is 
expected to provide these services, but “family” is often defined 
in heteronormative terms.300 When benefits are distributed, 
they are often distributed through the marital unit.301 This 
necessarily forms a converse relationship between the 
allocation of benefits and societal progress in the form of 
recognition of nontraditional family structures. Were the 
United States to change to an individual system, the general 
sense of inequity that results from allocating benefits on the 
basis of marital status would likely retain its same character 
 
297. Id. at 624-25. 
298. Id. at 621. 
299. Martha A. Fineman, Why Marriage?, in JUST MARRIAGE 46, 47 
(Mary Lyndon Shanley ed., 2004). 
300. Id. at 47-49. 
301. Id. at 47-48. "Unlike other industrial democracies, in which the 
state assures some floor of social services to each citizen, in America 
individual needs are managed by the family unit." Id. at 47. As mentioned 
earlier, marriage affords citizens over eleven hundred rights and privileges. 
BRAKE, supra note 20, at 12. 
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unless a significant overhaul were to occur within the tax laws 
to ensure that those in nontraditional relationships received 
recognition. Yet if the United States retained the joint 
character of its system and allowed those other than married 
couples to receive financial benefits typically allocated only to 
those who are married, this would serve to directly encourage 
progress in the form of the recognition of nontraditional family 
structures. Furthermore, such an action would also ensure that 
those in dependent relationships received benefits directly and 
be recognized as if they were a marital unit. In contrast, the 
adoption of a strictly individual system, or a modified 
individual system, is unlikely to promote the objective of 
allocating the greatest benefit to those in nontraditional yet 
interdependent relationships. 
In the bankruptcy context, adoption of an individual 
system would not succeed in furthering the objectives 
underlying the enactment of § 302. The creation of an 
individual bankruptcy system would have the same advantage 
of a strictly individual unit of taxation, namely that married 
and non-married persons would be treated alike. Such a system 
would also be simple to implement given that the only step 
necessary to take would be a complete repeal of § 302, but it 
would not serve to further any of the goals underlying its 
enactment. For one, a reversion to individual proceedings 
would place great administrative burden on the bankruptcy 
courts, and on debtors who would be forced to pay more than 
one filing fee and pay twice the cost in legal fees.302 Debtors 
would also incur the inconvenience that comes with having two 
court proceedings instead of one.303 Such a system would also 
be administratively impracticable, since debtors who share a 
significant amount of assets would be forced into two 
proceedings.304 Under the current regime set forth by § 302, 
however, significant inequity occurs when the benefits of joint 
petitioning are allocated according to marital status.305 It is 
possible, however, to not only increase the efficiency and 
 
302. See S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
303. Id. 
304. Id. 
305. 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012). 
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fairness of the Bankruptcy Code, but also to do so while 
simultaneously achieving the same result within the Internal 
Revenue Code. 
 
C. A Unit Based on Presumed Economic Interdependence 
 
The alternative to both a complete or partial abandonment 
of a joint regime and a regime which expresses preference for 
the heteronormative traditional marriage is a regime which 
allocates benefits based on a unit of presumed economic 
interdependence. This proposed regime will further the legal 
objectives of the tax and bankruptcy laws and provide the 
greatest probability of equity within the American context. It 
will also provide a useful and efficient unit that will be freely 
transferable between the tax and bankruptcy systems, thus 
furthering both legal homogeny and efficiency. Furthermore, 
such a system will help to provide a step in freeing the 
American legal regime from a system which provides numerous 
benefits to those who are married to the exclusion of those who 
are living in nontraditional interdependent relationships. 
There are signs that both the IRS and the bankruptcy 
courts are ready to recognize other interdependent couplings, 
particularly in the areas of same-sex marriage and 
cohabitation. In one letter, the IRS indicated that an Illinois 
opposite-sex couple that had obtained a civil union would not 
be precluded from filing jointly so long as Illinois treated them 
as husband and wife.306 The IRS has also provided in a private 
letter ruling that although registered domestic partners in 
California must file as single individuals, they also must report 
half of their earned income and property on their tax return.307 
 
306. Letter from Pamela Wilson Fuller, Senior Technician Reviewer, 
IRS, to Robert Shair, Senior Tax Advisor, H&R Block (Aug. 30, 2011), 
available at http://www.proskauer.com/files/uploads/Documents/IRS-Letter-
2011-on-Civil-Unions-in-Illinois.pdf. 
307. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201021048 (May 28, 2010). A private letter 
ruling is issued by the IRS in response to a taxpayer's question, and the IRS 
writes a response based only on the particular factual situation provided by 
the taxpayer. Nelson, supra note 84, at 1163. A private letter ruling is not 
binding as precedent, and is binding on the IRS only if the taxpayer fully 
articulated and described a transaction, and followed through with the 
transaction as it was described to the IRS. Id. Although private letter rulings 
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In doing so, the IRS recognized California’s extension of 
community property to registered domestic partners, which 
permits the splitting of property.308 Similarly, when § 3 of the 
DOMA was still in force, one California bankruptcy court 
permitted a same-sex couple who otherwise qualified to jointly 
file their petition for a Chapter 13 plan.309 In 1981, one 
bankruptcy court denied a request for consolidation on behalf 
of two cohabiting debtors who filed Chapter 13, but nonetheless 
still permitted joint administration of their bankrupt estates.310 
Most recently, the IRS held that it would recognize legally 
performed same-sex marriages for taxation purposes, 
regardless of whether the same-sex couple currently resides in 
a state that allows same-sex couples to marry.311 In order to 
accomplish similar effects consistently, however, the law must 
be expanded. 
First, this proposed unit shall be called the “unit of 
presumed economic interdependence.” As articulated by 
Infanti, the word “interdependence” is preferable to the word 
“dependence.”312 Although the word “dependence” is commonly 
used, the word connotes a “parasitic” relationship, when a 
given “dependent” relationship may more realistically be one of 
“give and take.”313 This is certainly the case in relationships 
such as parent-child (as the child grows to eventually care for 
the elderly parent), or in the case of spouses who may 
contribute various types of labor and support throughout the 
duration of their marriage.314 
This Comment next proposes that the Internal Revenue 
 
are not binding, may not be used as precedent, and do not have to be applied 
to other similarly situated taxpayers, private letter rulings can offer a 
glimpse as to how the IRS feels about a particular issue. Id. 
308. I.R.S. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 201021048 (May 28, 2010). 
309. See generally In re Balas, 449 B.R. 567 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2011). 
Same-sex couples are now permitted to file joint bankruptcy petitions, and 
gendered language within the Bankruptcy Code or Federal Rules of 
Bankruptcy Procedure is interpreted to apply to same-sex couples. See supra 
note 137. 
310. In re Coles, 14 B.R. 5 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981). 
311. I.R.S. Rev. Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. 
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Service articulate and define relationships of interdependence 
to be explicitly adopted by Congress in the Bankruptcy Code. 
To do so would be an extension, rather than an addition, of 
existing law. The IRS already allows individuals to take 
deductions for their “dependents,” and has codified the 
qualifications for dependency in § 152 of the Internal Revenue 
Code.315 These dependency deductions, as currently stated, 
provide an inefficient basis for a unit of presumed economic 
interdependence insofar as they fail to reflect current societal 
conditions. With few exceptions, these definitions generally 
require that one be a “qualifying child” or “qualifying relative” 
in order to qualify for “dependency.”316 In order to be a 
qualifying child, one must be “the child of the taxpayer or a 
descendent of such child,”317 or “a brother, sister, stepbrother, 
or stepsister of the taxpayer or a descendant of any such 
relative.”318 A qualifying child must also meet the requisite age 
requirements of being eighteen years of age or younger, or if a 
student, twenty-four years of age or younger.319 Section 152(d), 
which describes the requisite relationships which permit 
classification as a qualifying relative, is much more extensive 
and provides in pertinent part that a qualifying relative is one 
who “bears a relationship to the taxpayer described in this 
paragraph if the individual is any of the following with respect 
to the taxpayer:” 
 
(A) A child or a descendant of a child. 
(B) A brother, sister, stepbrother, or stepsister. 
(C) The father or mother, or an ancestor of 
either. 
(D) A stepfather or stepmother. 
 
315. 26 U.S.C. § 152 (2012). 
316. Id. 
317. Id. at § 152(c)(2)(A). 
318. Id. at § 152(c)(2)(B). A qualifying child must also have resided at 
the same principal place of residence as the taxpayer for at least one half of 
the taxable year, have met age requirements, have not provided over one half 
of his or her own support, and must not have filed a joint return with a 
spouse. Id. at § 152(c)(1)(B)-(E). Adopted children are recognized as 
dependents under § 152 provided that all other requirements are met. Id. at § 
152 (b)(3)(B). 
319. 26 U.S.C. § 152(c)(3). 
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(E) A son or daughter of a brother or sister of the 
taxpayer. 
(F) A brother or sister of the father or mother of 
the taxpayer. 
(G) A son-in-law, daughter-in-law, father-in-law, 
mother-in-law, brother-in-law, or sister-in-law. 
(H) An individual (other than an individual who 
at any time during the taxable year was the 
spouse, determined without regard to section 
7703, of the taxpayer) who, for the taxable year 
of the taxpayer, has the same principal place of 
abode as the taxpayer and is a member of the 
taxpayer’s household.320 
 
With some revisions, § 152 would provide a sufficient basis 
on which to base a unit of presumed economic interdependence 
for joint filing purposes. The necessary revision, in this 
instance, would be to add an additional subdivision to § 152 
titled “Application for Joint Filing Purposes.” This section 
would then need to affirm that the dependent relationships 
mentioned in § 152 are to be used to determine a unit of 
presumed economic interdependence for joint filing purposes 
under the Internal Revenue Code. Since a strict application of  
§ 152 would be insufficient for joint filing purposes insofar as it 
fails to recognize relationships between individuals who are not 
related by means of blood, adoption, or marriage, and likewise 
includes minor children, some qualifying provisions would then 
need to be added.321 
In order to provide recognition for those who are not 
related by blood, adoption, or marriage, this section should 
specify that in addition to those relationships articulated in § 
 
320. Id. at § 152(d)(2)(A)-(H). A qualifying relative must also have gross 
income that is less than the amount for a personal exemption, must provide 
over one half-of his or her support, and cannot be a qualifying child. Id. at § 
152(d)(1)(B)-(D); 26 U.S.C. 151(d) (deductions for personal exemptions). 
321. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 152(d)(2)(A)-(H) (depicting blood and 
marital relations); id. at § 152(b)(3)(B) (recognizing adoption); id. at § 152 
(b)(2) (recognizing married persons insofar as providing that their marital 
status and act of filing a joint return with their partner will preclude 
determination as a dependent). 
51
  
470 PACE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 34:1 
152, the additional interdependent unit of “cohabiting 
partnership” is to be recognized, without regard to whether or 
not the relationship is one based on conjugal relations. For 
purposes of establishing a cohabiting partnership, the Internal 
Revenue Code would be able to borrow the concept behind the 
property requirement in the definition of “qualifying child,” and 
provide that a cohabiting partnership is established when the 
taxpayers share a principal place of abode for at least half of 
the taxable year.322 In addition, this new subdivision of § 152 
would need to provide that for joint filing purposes, individuals 
must be aged eighteen and older. This would avoid a situation 
in which an adult files a joint income tax return with a 
minor.323 Finally, this section would simply need to provide 
that interdependent units are released from the fixed levels of 
financial support required in § 152 to establish the dependency 
of a relative.324 Any provision that provides that one individual 
provide a certain amount of support for one another is 
characteristic of a dependent relationship, as opposed to a 
relationship of presumed economic interdependence. Section 
152 would also need to release interdependent units from any 
restrictions on personal exemptions that would otherwise limit 
them from qualifying as a qualifying relative.325 
In order for these rules to apply in the bankruptcy context, 
Congress would simply need to amend the Bankruptcy Code to 
explicitly authorize and require the use of § 152 for joint 
petitioning purposes in § 302(a), and likewise amend the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure to permit the 
facilitation of consolidation for joint petitioners as permitted by 
 
322. See id. at § 152(c)(1)(B). 
323. It is not difficult to fathom how, without this provision, an abuse of 
the system of taxation may ensue, especially if one were to try and obtain tax 
benefits by filing with an infant. In that case, there would be no 
"interdependent relationship," since the relationship between an infant and 
an adult such as a parent is one of dependency, not interdependency. 
324. See 26 U.S.C. § 152 (d)(1)(C) (requiring that a taxpayer provide 
"over one-half of the individual's support for the calendar year in which such 
taxable year begins" in order to qualify as a qualifying relative). 
325. See id. at § 152(d)(1)(B) (requiring that individuals comport with 
the requirements of § 151(d) in order to qualify as a qualifying relative); id. at 
§ 151(d)(2) (disallowing personal exemptions for certain dependents). 
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§ 152.326 As Erin Healy notes, the definitions of dependency 
articulated in § 152 have already been utilized by the 
bankruptcy courts in some limited contexts.327 When 
calculating income and disposable income, the Bankruptcy 
Code permits debtors to support “dependents,” but does not 
provide a complete definition of which individuals constitute 
“dependents.”328 Bankruptcy courts have had varying reactions 
to this definitional predicament. At least one court refused to 
deny a debtor a request for granting dependency status to a 
qualifying dependent because Congress had not explicitly 
codified § 152 of the Internal Revenue Code into the 
Bankruptcy Code.329 Other judges, however, have readily 
utilized the IRS’s definition of dependency in § 152 for 
determining dependency status in bankruptcy in the absence of 
a duty of legal support between debtor and “dependent.”330 
Section 152 is not the only instance, however, of 
bankruptcy courts “borrowing” concepts and law from the IRS. 
As a result of the 2005 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code 
under the BAPCPA, debtors are required under § 
707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) to use the National and Local Standards set 
forth by the IRS for purposes of determining their disposable 
income for a means test analysis.331 The use of these standards 
 
326. See 11 U.S.C. § 302 (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(a). For purposes 
of clarification, it should be noted that any of the proposed changes to the 
Internal Revenue Code or the Bankruptcy Code operate as an extension of 
the law as it already applies to married couples. Thus, any provisions which 
already apply to married couples and permit them to file a joint tax return or 
jointly petition the bankruptcy courts would remain. The proposed revisions 
in this Comment are intended to provide those in nontraditional dyadic living 
arrangements with the rights and privileges currently provided to married 
couples under the tax and bankruptcy laws. 
327. Healy, supra note 286, at 207-08. 
328. Id. at 205. 
329. Id. at 207-08. 
330. Id. 
331. 11 U.S.C. § 707(b)(2)(A)(ii)(I) (2012). See also Collection Financial 
Standards, I.R.S., http://www.irs.gov/Individuals/Collection-Financial-
Standards (last updated Sept. 3, 2013). This website describes when National 
versus Local Standards are used when determining the allowable 
expenditure amounts for various areas of a personal or family budget, such as 
food and transportation. Id. According to the IRS, the National and Local 
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for a means testing analysis is admittedly questionable. The 
original purpose of these standards was to collect unpaid taxes 
from delinquent taxpayers who may otherwise be facing time 
spent in jail.332 The wisdom of using the National and Local 
Standards in the bankruptcy context is beyond the scope of this 
Comment, but the use of this data does demonstrate that the 
Internal Revenue Code and the Bankruptcy Code are in some 
ways inextricably connected, and that data from the IRS has 
the potential to be efficiently shared, even if not in the case of 
means testing. 
Next, once two individuals elect for a joint filing under 
either the Internal Revenue Code or the Bankruptcy Code, 
there should be a rebuttable presumption that they are a unit 
of presumed economic interdependence. When two individuals 
in a qualifying relationship file a joint tax return or a joint 
bankruptcy petition, they will do so under the presumption 
that they will have jointly pooled their assets. For joint filing 
purposes, this would function much in the same way that the 
marital unit does now, and the presumption of economic 
interdependence would be rebutted in cases where individuals 
fraudulently misrepresent their relationship. Stated more 
simply, individuals who file jointly, much like marital couples, 
will not have to prove that they jointly own a certain number of 
assets, but if questioned they may have to prove that they have 
the stated relationship that they claim. The reason for 
potentially requiring objective proof of a relationship is perhaps 
the most obvious. Given that conjugal, blood, or adoptive 
relations will not necessarily play a role in determining 
whether or not one may have a unit of presumed economic 
interdependence, which would be the case in a non-conjugal 
cohabiting partnership, this will ensure that individuals have 
the stated relationship that they claim. It will thus likewise 
prevent those without qualifying relationships, such as 
complete strangers, from taking advantage of the benefits of 
the tax and bankruptcy systems. 
To potentially require proof of interdependency as 
measured by a specified number of joint assets, however, has 
the potential to hamper the objectives of the bankruptcy and 
 
332. Healy, supra note 286, at 202. 
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tax systems by having a negative impact on judicial economy 
and making the objective of ease of case administration 
impracticable. A. Mechele Dickerson provides an example of a 
proposal which would include the requirement of potentially 
proving such dependency.333 Dickerson suggests that § 101, the 
“definitional” section of the Bankruptcy Code, be amended to 
include a definition of economic unit and that § 302 be 
amended to reflect that change.334 This proposal is similar to 
the one proposed here, since although limited to the 
bankruptcy context, it provides for an economic as opposed to a 
marital unit. Under Dickerson’s proposal, however, an 
individual may be forced to prove their economic 
interdependency.335 She suggests that to prove this 
dependency, one must look to the standards of other courts; as 
an example, she provides a multifactor test utilized by the New 
York Court of Appeals that requires a sufficient number of 
inextricably linked joint assets.336 This, however, does not 
adequately support the goal of administrative ease, and could 
lead to an overwhelming burden on the court system if 
excessively challenged. 
Additionally, the unit based on presumed economic 
interdependence that is articulated in this Comment operates 
as an extension on the current marital unit for bankruptcy and 
tax purposes by simply expanding joint filing to relationships 
that do not neatly fit into the hetero-normative norm. Under 
the current regime, married couples are presumed to have 
pooled their assets when they file jointly for tax and 
bankruptcy purposes.337 Neither the Internal Revenue Code 
nor the Bankruptcy Code, however, requires married couples to 
demonstrate that they have jointly pooled their assets as a 
prerequisite to joint filing.338 In fact, the Bankruptcy Code does 
 




337. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). While the presumption of pooling 
is explicit in the bankruptcy context, it takes the form of an after the fact 
justification in the tax context. Infanti, supra note 144, at 614. 
338. See 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012) (permitting spouses to petition for 
bankruptcy jointly); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2012) (permitting husband and wife 
to file a joint income tax return). 
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not require asset pooling in spite of a legislative history that 
indicates that pooling of assets was one of the reasons for 
creating the joint bankruptcy petition.339 Section 522(a), for 
example, provides that a debtor’s spouse may be considered a 
dependent without regard to actual dependency.340 Likewise, 
the authorization of consolidation under § 302(b) in cases of 
jointly owned assets seems to contemplate the consideration 
that individuals in a “dependent” relationship may not be 
completely dependent in the financial sense.341 Thus, the 
proposed unit of presumed economic interdependence will 
operate on a presumption that those in qualifying 
interdependent relationships pool their resources, but will 
ultimately serve to further the goals of vast economic benefit to 
taxpayers, facilitate ease of case administration, and further 
both judicial and administrative economy. 
This system, however, does have one limitation—each 
individual shall be limited to filing within one economic unit 
consisting of two persons. As Erez Aloni has stated, “the legal 
system in the United States is bound up so closely with, and 
organized so thoroughly around, the concept of couples that it 
is very difficult to disaggregate this concept from that of the 
conferral of many rights and benefits.”342 According to Aloni, 
were the United States to recognize multiple partnerships at 
this time, it would bring the same types of problems with 
distribution of benefits as it does with the polyamorous 
community.343 It is not impossible that such a system may be 
adopted sometime in the future, but it is not a future that 
realistically speaking, will happen soon.344 Thus, much like the 
research of Aloni, this proposal is based off of practical 
necessity and “realpolitik.”345 
Since one citizen may only have one chosen partner to 
establish a unit of presumed economic interdependence with, 
 
339. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
340. 11 U.S.C. § 522(a). 
341. Chapman, supra note 134, at 137-38. 
342. Aloni, supra note 19, at 612. 
343. Id. But see Adrienne D. Davis, Regulating Polygamy: Intimacy, 
Default Rules, and Bargaining for Equality, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 1955 (2010). 
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this system will likely not change the function of the tax and 
bankruptcy laws for those who are already living in traditional 
heteronormative marriages. It will, however, open up these 
laws to those in nontraditional living arrangements, and for 
whom certain provisions of the bankruptcy and tax codes were 
previously inaccessible. Allowing those with nontraditional 
economically interdependent relationships to file jointly on the 
same paperwork and forms used by married couples for tax and 
bankruptcy purposes will have the additional benefits of 
serving to legitimize these nontraditional relationships in the 
eyes of the law and also begin the more gradual process of 





As it remains now under the law, the single determinative 
factor regarding whether or not two individuals may file jointly 
for tax and bankruptcy purposes is their marital status.346 
Although both bankruptcy and tax law share this same 
determinative factor for joint filing purposes, they each arrived 
at this same result in different ways. History demonstrates 
that the joint income tax was not only the result of a 
contentious and long-lasting debate concerning the proper roles 
of men and women, but also the result of a desire for national 
uniformity of the tax laws, a legitimate means of assigning 
income to lower tax liability, and desire among some to 
preserve traditional gender roles.347 The joint bankruptcy 
petition, in contrast, was a sign that the vestiges of the long-
reaching arm of the doctrine of coverture were continuing to 
erode.348 Married women were owning property and incurring 
 
346. 11 U.S.C. § 302(a) (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 6013(a) (2012); I.R.S. Rev. 
Rul. 2013-17, 2013-38 I.R.B. 201. But see supra notes 306-10 and 
accompanying text (describing some exceptions to this rule). 
347. Gann, supra note 83, at 18; Jones, supra note 88, at 261, 276; 
Kessler-Harris, supra note 60, 333-36; McMahon, supra note 48, at 731. 
348. Compare Pearlston, supra note 103, at 271-72 (describing the 
assumption of past and future debt by a husband under the doctrine of 
coverture), with In re Knobel 167 B.R. at 439-40 (describing how by 1979 
most of the obstacles that kept women from filing for bankruptcy had largely 
been removed, and the new Code which permitted joint filing reflected this 
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debts, and some of them would file for bankruptcy. Based on 
the assumption that married persons jointly incurred debts and 
assets, Congress permitted married couples to petition the 
courts for bankruptcy together.349 
Joint filing is certainly better for some married couples 
than others. Due to the effect of income splitting and the 
inability of married couples to take advantage of the same tax 
rates as unmarried individuals, some married couples will 
experience a penalty and others will experience a bonus.350 In 
bankruptcy, married couples who file jointly will benefit from 
only having one filing fee to pay and from only having to hire 
one attorney.351 They may also miss less time from work with 
permission from the court to have one spouse appear as 
opposed to both.352 If their case is consolidated, however, and 
they have not chosen their exemptions, their exemptions may 
be chosen for them.353 
The joint income tax with the income splitting regime still 
applicable today became part of the law of taxation in 1948.354 
The joint bankruptcy petition was added to the Bankruptcy 
Code in 1978.355 As these laws have remained in effect, the 
demographics of the American household have changed. 
Marriage rates have been on a steady decline.356 Rates of 
cohabitation have been on the rise.357 Many adults find that 
they are part of the Sandwich Generation, in which they 
support both an elderly parent and a child.358 Many adult 
children now find they are in the Boomerang Generation, and 
once again living with their parents.359 Economic recession may 
 
change). 
349. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
350. See supra notes 140-61 and accompanying text (discussing the 
marriage bonus versus the marriage penalty). 
351. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978); Dickerson, Love, Honor, and (Oh!) 
Pay, supra note 107, at 975-76. 
352. Dickerson, Family Values, supra note 97, at 91. 
353. 11 U.S.C. § 522(b) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(e). 
354. Jones, supra note 88, at 260. 
355. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
356. Fry, Decline of Marriage, supra note 232. 
357. Id. 
358. Parker & Patten, supra note 259. 
359. Parker, supra note 258. 
58http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol34/iss1/9
  
2014] MOVING BEYOND MARRIAGE 477 
have been the cause behind the rise in multigenerational 
households.360 Many states now recognize gay marriage, and 
others provide civil unions.361 Households with traditional male 
breadwinner family structures are on a decline.362 
As demographic changes occurred within American 
households, the joint filing regime which permitted married 
couples to file jointly became more antiquated and less 
relevant. As the households with traditional male breadwinner 
families declined and dual wage earner families rose in 
number, income splitting benefitted fewer families than it used 
to.363 The joint bankruptcy petition, upon which enactment was 
predicated on ease of case administration and the presumption 
that married persons should file together due to the pooling of 
resources, seemed to lose touch with its original objectives.364  
A unit that is not based on marital status, however, will 
allow the bankruptcy and tax systems to reflect the changes 
that have occurred within American society. If § 152 of the 
Internal Revenue Code were expanded to include other 
qualifying relationships of presumed economic interdependence 
and adopted by the Bankruptcy Code, this would allow 
individuals to file jointly with one another based on their 
presumed economic interdependence as opposed to marital 
status. In bankruptcy, this would have the advantage of 
facilitating ease of case administration, lessening the burden 
on the courts, and offering potential advantages to those who 
are presumed to have pooled their resources. In tax, this would 
potentially allocate benefits to those who have strong economic 
ties yet do not qualify as married. In this sense, the laws 
regarding joint filing would be more efficient. This simple 
expansion of the law would also further serve the principle of 
equality, as individuals would no longer be treated solely on 
the basis of their marital status for joint filing purposes, but on 
the basis of their economic relationship. Thus, by adopting a 
unit of presumed economic interdependence for joint filing 
 
360. Kochhar & Cohn, supra note 256. 
361. See supra note 255 (describing current legal status of gay marriage 
among the states). 
362. See supra note 274. 
363. Id. 
364. S. REP. NO. 95-989, at 32 (1978). 
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purposes, the original objectives of the laws would be better 
served, equality under the law and efficiency of the law would 
be duly promoted, and the bankruptcy and tax laws would 
more adequately reflect the relational definitions and 
demographic realities of American life. 
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